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Pretrial Drug Testing:
Is It Vulnerable To Due Process Challenges?
Peter H. Meyers*
This nation may be on the brink of an explosion of
programs that use drug testing to determine whether criminal
defendants should be jailed or released prior to trial. More than
a dozen state and federal courts around the country have
already experimented with pretrial drug testing programs
modeled after the one operating in the District of Columbia
since 1984. 1 Similar programs would be mandated nation-wide
by several bills now pending in Congress with strong Bush
administration backing. 2

* Visiting Professor of Clinical Law, National Law Center, George Washington
University. J.D. 1971, National Law Center; B.A. 1968, Marietta College. The
author wishes to thank Professors Eric Sirulnik and John Banzhaf for their
comments and suggestions on previous drafts. The author also wishes to thank
John Carver, Director of the District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency, for his
generous cooperation.
1.
The District of Columbia program was the first comprehensive pretrial drug
testing rrogram in the United States. JOHN CARVER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., DRUGS
AND CRIME: CONTROLLING USE AND REDUCING RISK THROUGH TESTING 2 (Sept./Oct.
1986). Similar drug testing programs were established in eight federal district
courts in 1989 and 1990, as part of a pilot project undertaken pursuant to the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690. These were the Eastern District
of Arkansas, Middle District of Florida, Eastern District of Michigan, District of
Minnesota, District of Nevada, Southern District of New York, District of North
Dakota, and Western District of Texas. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, FINAL REPORT: THE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM OF MANDATORY
DRUG TESTING OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 19 (1991) (hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
At least six county court systems have also experimented with pretrial drug
testing: Maricopa County (Phoenix), Arizona; Pima County (Tucson), Arizona; New
Castle County (Wilmington), Delaware; Prince George's County, Maryland;
Multnomah County (Portland), Oregon; and Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. See
JOHN CLARK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., ESTIMATING THE CO&'TS OF DRUG TESTING FOR A
PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAM 1 (1989); see also Richard B. Abell, Pretrial Drug
Testing: Expanding Rights and Protecting Public Safety, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
943, 946 n.l5 (1989); James K. Stewart, Quid Pro Quo: Stay Drug Free and Stay
on Release, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1988).
2.
See, e.g., S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), introduced by Sen. Thurmond
and others, which requires states receiving certain criminal justice funds to
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Unfortunately, many of those who lose their liberty as a
result of a positive drug test may be victims of a test which
falsely reports drug use if the defendant simply consumed one
of many common medicines, or if certain basic mistakes or
mixups occurred in the court's drug-detection laboratory. This
article suggests that such drug programs can and should be
challenged as a clear violation of due process if, as in the
District of Columbia, the program fails to use an available and
virtually foolproof test to confirm drug use before restricting a
defendant's liberty. This article also suggests that procedures
currently in effect in the District fail to provide a
constitutionally adequate warning to the defendant of the
adverse consequences that a positive drug test can have in the
court proceeding before the defendant agrees to submit a urine
sample.
Since a positive drug test result can lead to incarceration
or other drastic impacts upon a defendant's liberty, pretrial
drug testing procedures should be as reliable and fair as
possible. These are core values that due process has long
protected when an individual is threatened with a loss of
liberty as a result of government action. 3 This article
addresses the procedural protections required by due process to
insure that drug testing results are accurate and reliable. This
analysis requires consideration of doctrines from both criminal
and administrative law, two areas that have merged in some
significant respects during the past few years.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 4 the Supreme Court fashioned a
three-part test for determining the scope of due process
protections. This test employs a cost/benefit analysis which
balances the burden on the government of providing an
additional procedural protection against the anticipated loss to
the individual if such protection is not provided, and the
increased reliability the additional protection will provide. This
test has been applied most commonly to determine whether
trial-type hearings or similar procedures are required.
However, this test has also been applied to a variety of other

implement pretrial drug testing programs in compliance with regulations issued by
the Attorney General. !d. at § 902. A separate provision mandates post-conviction
drug testing of federal defendants. ld. at § 901.
3.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 558 (1974).
4.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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situations as well.
This article suggests that the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis
should be applied, in conjunction with other factors, to evaluate
the constitutionality of procedures such as pretrial drug
testing. 5 To illustrate the utility of the Mathews v. Eldridge
approach, this article will apply it to the need for confirmatory
testing in the District's drug program, 6 and compare this
methodology to the approaches recently taken by the Supreme
Court on several related issues, including drug testing of
government employees, 7 pretrial preventive detention
procedures, 8 and prompt probable cause hearings for persons
who have been arrested. 9
Establishment of pretrial drug testing programs
throughout the United States may or may not be a desirable
objective. 10 However, if such programs are created, it is vital

5.
See John F. Banzhaf, How to Make Drug Tests Pass Constitutional Muster,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 12, 1987, at 13.
It is necessary to focus on a specific program because due process analysis
6.
is dependent, in part, upon the details of a jurisdiction's bail law, its drug testing
procedures, and the ways in which the drug testing results are utilized by judicial
officers in the jurisdiction.
7.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). These cases upheld
drug testing of certain government employees as reasonable searches and seizures
within the Fourth Amendment. In both cases, the Court emphasized that the
procedures employed in the drug testing programs made the test results quite
reliable. In both cases, the initial immunoassay screen was confirmed by "state-ofthe-art equipment and techniques," Skinner, 489 U.S. at 610 n.3; Von Raab, 489
U.S. at 673 n.2 ("[t]he combination of EMIT and GC/MS tests required by the
Service is highly accurate, assuming proper storage, handling, and measurement
techniques.").
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding federal preventive
8.
detention law procedures); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (state juvenile
preventive detention law procedures upheld).
9.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975) (Fourth Amendment requires
prompt judicial determination of probable cause for any significant pretrial
restraint on liberty); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991)
(initial court hearings within 48 hours of arrests are presumed sufficiently prompt
within the meaning of Gerstein).
10.
Compare KEVIN B. ZEESE, DRUG TESI'ING LEGAL MANUAL §§ 8.01-02 (Clark
Boardman 1988) with Abell, supra note 1, at 943-44.
In addition to due process concerns about the fairness and reliability of pretrial
drug testing, there are also substantial unanswered questions as to whether such
programs constitute unreasonable searches and seizures within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The District of Columbia
Circuit at one time ordered a full evidentiary hearing on these Fourth Amendment
challenges to the District's drug testing program, but on remand the case was
dismissed for want of prosecution. Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031
(D.C. Cir. 1987), dismissed for want of prosecution, Civil Act. No. 84-2659 (D.D.C.
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that they be as fair and reliable as possible. The legislatures,
and ultimately the courts, will be called upon to insure that
drug testing programs in the criminal justice system satisfy
due process standards. Pretrial drug testing programs cannot
be second-rate, not only because they involve the court's own
essential criminal procedures, but also because of the drastic
potential consequences of positive test results. 11
Part I of this article describes the District's criminal laws
and procedures. Part II discusses the scope and operation of
the District's drug testing program. Part III sets forth the
applicable due process principles and analyzes the Mathews v.
Eldridge test. Part IV identifies the protected "liberty" interests
which trigger due process protections for pretrial drug testing.
Part V addresses the need to confirm positive drug tests in
different pretrial circumstances. Part VI discusses other due
process concerns with the District's program. Finally, Part VII
analyzes the usefulness of Mathews v. Eldridge in determining
the scope of due process protections.
I.

A.

D.C. CRIMINAL PROCEDURES

The Initial Hearing

Virtually everyone arrested in the District of Columbia is
brought before a judicial officer of the D.C. Superior Court for
an initial hearing. 12 The procedure for this initial hearing has

Aug. 1, 1990). For a discussion of these Fourth Amendment issues, see Cathryn Jo
Rosen and John S. Goldkamp, The Constitutionality of Drug Testing at the Bail
Stage, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 114 (1989). Cf Cathryn Jo Rosen, The
Fourth Amendment Implications of Urine Testing for Evidence of Drug Use in
Probation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1159 (1990).
Drug testing laboratories that report erroneous positive test results to the
11.
court could also be found civilly liable to defendants injured by the erroneous
information. In one recently reported case, a private employee fired because of a
false positive drug test result received a $4.1 million jury verdict (mostly punitive
damages) against the laboratory. See Andrew Blum, State Drug Test Rules are
Varied: Some are Permissive; Others Regulate Strictly, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1991, at
1.

12.
The principal exceptions are persons charged with federal offenses in the
United States District Court (which does not have a comprehensive drug testing
program), and persons who are released on citation or bond release (for relatively
minor offenses) from police precincts.
Due to the District of Columbia's unique status in relationship to the federal
government, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia is responsible
for prosecuting cases in both federal and superior court, and must decide in which
court charges will be brought. There has been a recent public squabble between
the U.S. Attorney and a number of federal judges because the U.S. Attorney has
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been codified in the court's Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provide that the arrested person shall be taken "without unnecessary delay" to the court, and that routine booking procedures
such as fingerprinting and photographing of the arrestee shall
be "performed with reasonable promptness." 13
Several important events occur at this initial hearing.
Defense counsel enters his or her appearance, the charge
against the defendant is read, and further dates are set for the
case to return to court. 14 The court also makes a decision on
whether to release the defendant pending trial, and, if so, under what conditions. 15 If the court imposes any conditions of
release which "constitute a significant restraint on pretrial
liberty," the court must also determine whether or not there is
probable cause to believe the defendant committed the charged
offense. 16
brought a substantial number of "small scale" drug and other offenses to federal
court to take advantage of the tougher federal sentencing provisions. This has substantially clogged the federal court. See Stop Complaining, Stephens Tells Judges,
WASHINGTON POST, June 8, 1991, at B1; Stephens vs. The Federal Bench: Both
Sides Look a Little Muddy, WASHINGTON PoST, June 17, 1991, at F5; Stephens
Assailed by Judge, WASHINGTON POST, May 25, 1991, at Bl.
18.
D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 5. Routine booking procedures are usually completed within one and one-half hours in the District of Columbia. See Lively v.
Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 999, 1008-09 (D.D.C. 1978), discussed in Wendy L.
Brandes, Comment, Post-Arrest Detention and the Fourth Amendment: Refining the
Standard of Gerstein v. Pugh, 22 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 445, 458-60 (1989).
The judicial officer will also inform the defendant that he or she is not
14.
required to make any statement and that any statement may be used against the
defendant. D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 5(b). The defendant is also informed of the
complaint and any affidavit filed with it, and of the defendant's right to have
retained or court-appointed counsel. ld.
If the case is charged as a felony (i.e., the maximum penalty exceeds one year),
the initial hearing is called the presentment. The defendant will not plead to the
complaint which has been filed in court, and only a future preliminary hearing
date will be set. If the case is charged as a misdemeanor (i.e., the maximum
penalty is one year or less), the initial hearing is called the arraignment. The
defendant will plead to the information, and future dates for a status hearing and
trial will be selected.
The initial bail hearing is usually presided over by a hearing commissioner,
whose authority is analogous to that of a federal magistrate. See D.C. SUPER. CT.
CRIM. R. 117. Generally, judges preside at the initial hearing only on Saturdays
and holidays.
15.
A substantial majority of adult arrestees (about 85%) are released pending
trial rather than detained at the initial hearing. Of these, more than 80% are
released on some form of non-financial conditions (i.e., without being required to
post a bail bond). Only persons released without financial conditions are eligible for
supervision, which includes urine surveillance, by the Pretrial Services Agency.
MARY TOBOHG & JOHN BELLASSAI, PRETRIAL URINE-TESTING IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA: THE PERSPECTIVE OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS IN 1989 1-2 (1989).
16.
See supra note 9. The juvenile justice system in the District has analogous
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The standards that the judicial officer applies in making
the initial bail decision are set forth in the District of Columbia
Bail Reform ActY The District of Columbia, like the federal
courts and many states, authorizes the judicial officer to consider both the defendant's risk of flight and risk of safety to the
community in setting bail. 18 The statute establishes a presumption in favor of release without conditions on personal
recognizance. 19
The judicial officer also has the authority to hold persons
without bond for short periods (three or five days) under certain circumstances, including the "five-day-hold" for narcotic
addicts, the "three-day-hold" where the defendant is already on
release in a pending case, and a "three-day-hold" for a preventive detention hearing. 20
The court is also authorized to order detention without
bond until trial when defendants are charged with first degree
murder2 1 or with certain other dangerous or violent offenses.22

procedures for processing youthful arrestees. See TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note
15, at 8-9.
17.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 et seq. (1989).
18.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1989). In evaluating these risks, the judicial
officer considers the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of
the evidence against the person, family ties to the area, employment, fmancial resources, character and mental condition, past conduct, length of residence in the
community, record of convictions, and any record of appearance or non-appearance
at prior court proceedings. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(b) (1989).
19.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1989); Wood v. United States, 391 F.2d 981,
983 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
When the judicial officer determines that personal recognizance or an unsecured
appearance bond will not reasonably assure the defendant's appearance at future
court hearings, or assure the safety of the community, the bail law expressly
requires the court to impose only those conditions that will reasonably assure the
defendant's appearance and community safety. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1989).
Money bonds can be imposed solely to minimize the risk of flight, not to assure
community safety. !d.; Jones v. United States, 347 A.2d 399, 401 (D.C. 1975).
Moreover, money bonds can only be set after careful consideration and rejection of
the various non-financial conditions of release. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1989).
20.
Each of these "holds" is discretionary with the court. If the court grants the
hold, the defendant is detained without bond for the prescribed number of days,
and then a judicial officer will reconsider the bond issue and make a decision on
whether to release the defendant. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(e) (1989) (probation and parole holds); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1323 (hold for narcotic addicts); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (hold for pending charge); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(c)
(preventive detention hold).
21.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1325(a) (Supp. 1991).
22.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a) (1989).
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Timing of the Initial Hearing

The timing of the initial hearing is important because it
determines the feasibility of conducting initial drug testing and
of using confirmatory tests.
The court's rules provide that the initial hearing shall be
conducted "without unnecessary delay."23 In practice, the initial hearing is usually held on the next day, within twenty-four
hours of arrest. The major exception to this is when the arrest
occurs on Saturday. Then, the initial hearing will generally be
held within forty-eight hours of arrest, since the court will not
sit again until Monday.
In Gerstein v. Pugh, 24 the Supreme Court held that the
probable cause determination must be made "promptly" whenever the person arrested is subjected to any significant restraint on his or her pretrial liberty. Subsequently, in the recent case of County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 25 the Court
ruled that there is a presumption that probable cause hearings
held within forty-eight hours of arrest are constitutional, and a
presumption that probable cause hearings held more than
forty-eight hours after arrest are unreasonably delayed, and
therefore unconstitutional, under Gerstein. 26 The Court indicated that routine booking procedures may be employed between the arrest and the probable cause hearing, so long as
these procedures and "other practical realities" do not unreasonably delay the probable cause hearing. 27 The Court's language suggests that routine drug testing could be one of those
"other practical realities" which could permissibly be accomplished prior to the initial hearing if it did not delay the probable cause determination beyond forty-eight hours. However, the

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

!d.

D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 5(a).
420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975).
111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991).
!d. at 1670.

See id.:
In evaluating whether the delay in a particular case is unreasonable,
however, courts must allow a substantial degree of flexibility. Courts
cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays in transporting arrested persons from one facility to another, handling late-night bookings where no
magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of an arresting
officer who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the premises of an arrest, and other practical realities.
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Court's language appears to make clear that "routine" procedures (like booking or drug testing) cannot constitutionally be
utilized if they delay the probable cause determination beyond
forty-eight hours. 28

C.

Sanctions for Non-Compliance

Defendants who are not detained at their initial hearings
are released with certain conditions and restrictions placed
upon them while the case is pending. For example, the release
form that all released defendants are required to sign provides
that they shall not commit any new offense while on release. If
they do, it could trigger further sanctions. 29
Many defendants are released on condition that they provide regular (usually once a week) urine samples at the courthouse. The trial judge is kept apprised of whether these defendants appear for the scheduled appointments and whether
urine samples submitted by defendants test positive or nega28.

See id.:
Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the calculus changes. In such a case, the arrested individual does not bear the burden of proving an unreasonable
delay. Rather, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the
existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.
The fact that in a particular case it may take longer than 48 hours to
consolidate pretrial proceedings does not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance.

ld.
Among the four dissenters in County of Riverside was Justice Scalia, who criticized as "extremely unpersuasive" the reasons given by the county for delaying
probable cause hearings, including the "need to take blood and urine samples
promptly in drug cases". ld. at 1676 n.3.
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1328 (1989) ("release papers" for persons convicted
29.
of a new offense while on release in an earlier case). Of course, possession of any
illicit drug in the District of Columbia is a criminal offense, D.C. CODE ANN. § 33541(d) (1989), and this would be a violation of the universally imposed condition of
release not to commit any criminal offense.
Possession of any illicit drug (or "controlled substance" as most statutes classify
them) is a misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in jail and a fine of up to
$1,000, or both, for a first offense. ld. For the "trafficking" offenses of possession
with intent to distribute, distribution, manufacture, etc., the penalty is almost
always a felony, with substantial mandatory minimum sentences involved. For
instance, there is a mandatory minimum sentence of four to twelve years for first
time trafficking offenses involving "street level" amounts of heroin and cocaine base
(crack). D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(c) (1988).
It is not an offense in the District, or in most other states, to "use" an illicit
drug. However, an individual must "possess" a drug (even for a very brief period of
time) in order to "use" it. See generally GERALD F. DELMAN & VICTOR G. HADDOX,
DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW SOURCEBOOK §§ 6.1-6.2 (Clark Boardman 1990).
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tive.
The trial judge has a wide array of sanctions that can be
imposed for violating the prohibition on the use of drugs or any
other condition of release. One option is to modify the conditions of release, by imposing a new monetary bond, or imposing
additional nonfinancial release conditions. 30 To find that a
person violated a condition of release, justifying modification of
those conditions, requires "clear and convincing" evidence of the
violation. 31 In other words, for a drug testing violation there
would have to be "clear and convincing" evidence that a positive drug test reflected actual drug use in violation of the
court's order.
The most potentially drastic result of a positive drug test is
the contempt hearing to determine if the defendant intentionally violated his or her release conditions. 32 This is a criminal
proceeding, presided over by the trial judge, who can impose a
separate conviction for contempt of court, and a sentence of up
to six months imprisonment or a fine of up to $1,000, or
both. 33 At this hearing, the defendant has essentially all the
due process rights a defendant has at any non-jury criminal
trial, 34 including the requirement that allegations against the
defendant be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt."35 Thus, the
issue in a contempt hearing is whether the government's drug
test proved "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the defendant had
used drugs in violation of release conditions. 36

30.
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23.1329 (1989). Trial judges have imposed a wide
variety of non-financial conditions of release on persons who have violated drug
testing requirements, including increased frequency of drug testing (e.g., from once
to twice a week), third party custody, curfew, or referral for treatment or counselling. See CARVER, supra note 1, at 3-4.
31.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1329(b)(1) (1989).
32.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-l329(c) (1989).
33.
!d.; see also D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 42(b). This is an out-of-court contempt, which requires an adversarial hearing to resolve, and cannot be dealt with
summarily. See D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 42(a); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
These due process rights include the right to notice and counsel, Cooke v.
34.
United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925), to call witnesses in defense, id., and to a
public trial before an impartial tribunal, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273-75.
35.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273-75; Parker v. United States, 373 A.2d 906,
907 (D.C. 1977).
36.
This is, of course, the heaviest burden of proof in the American legal
system. The criminal contempt proceeding is the most compelling context for
requiring confirmation or other procedures to ensure reliability, because of this
burden of proof, and for other reasons discussed below.
The use of contempt hearings to deal with positive drug tests was more widespread at the beginning of the District's program than it is today. Toborg and
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Other less severe actions can also be taken by the trial
judge as the result of a positive drug test, including a stern
warning to the defendant, or holding the defendant in custody
until court recesses later that same day. 37
II.

D.C. DRUG TESTING PROGRAM

A. Creation and Operation of the Program
Drug testing of arrestees in the District of Columbia has
existed since the early 1970s, but on such an infrequent basis
that it had minimal impact on the criminal justice system. 38
Beginning in March of 1984, a new comprehensive pretrial
drug testing program was established for adult arrestees, and
extended to cover juveniles in 1986. 39 This program calls for
the testing of arrestees in three situations: (1) routine testing
of persons prior to their initial hearing, (2) testing of persons
released at the initial hearing, and (3) testing in accordance
with special orders of the court, such as when a defendant is
late to court. 40
The drug testing program is operated by the D.C. Pretrial
Services Agency ("PSA"), an independent agency of the D.C.
GovernmentY PSA employees go to the superior court lock-up
early each morning to collect urine samples from arrestees. 42
Bellassai explain this trend:
Many judges who back in 1985 reported that they often held contempt
hearings for condition violations told the Toborg Associates study team in
1989 that they no longer did so as frequently because of the press of
ever-growing court dockets.
TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 25.
37.
ld.
38.
CARVER, supra note 1, at 2.
39.
TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 1. The D.C. program was promoted
and initially funded by the National Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department of
Justice. CARVER, supra note 1, at 1. The D.C. program tests adults for five categories of drugs: opiates (primarily heroin), cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP),
amphetamines, and methadone. Juveniles are tested for similar drugs, except that
they are tested for marijuana but not amphetamines. ld. at 7-8.
CARVER, supra note 1, at 2. PSA conducts tests on approximately 65,00040.
70,000 urine samples each year, including adults and juveniles. Conversation with
John Carver, Director of the District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency (1991).
41.
PSA has several responsibilities: It interviews all adult arrestees to determine their eligibility for pretrial release; it makes release recommendations to the
judicial officer presiding at the initial hearing; and, it monitors compliance with
release conditions for all defendants, except those released on surety bond. D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-1301 to 23-1302 (1989); TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at
1.
42.
Some defendants refuse to provide a urine sample, some are unable to
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The arrestees are requested to provide urine samples, and told
by the PSA representative that the test result will be used only
for determining conditions of release and not used as evidence
to prove guilt of the underlying chargeY
While a defendant in lock-up has the right to refuse to
provide a urine sample, just as the defendant can refuse to be
interviewed at all by PSA (to obtain general background information), very few refuse to provide a urine sample. 44 In the
provide one, and some are brought in too late in the morning to be tested. Often,
the judicial officer will condition release for these defendants upon the subsequent
provision of a urine sample. MARY TOBORG & JOHN BELLASSAI, PRETRIAL URINE
TESTING IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: THE VIEWS OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS 4 (1986).
PSA staff wait at the lock-up while the arrestees provide urine samples, and
observe the collection process, to prevent tampering or substitution of one person's
urine for another. CARVER, supra note 1, at 4. Mter the sample is provided, the
arrestee verifies his or her name and seals the specimen cap. The sample is then
taken directly from the cellblock to PSA's on-site laboratory, which is located in
the same building as the lock-up.
43.
CARVER, supra note 1, at
The PSA staff member bases his or her representations on the directives of the agency's Training Manual:
My name is _ _ _ and I work for the Pretrial Services Agency. I
am here to collect a urine sample from you. You do not have to give a
sample, but if you do, the sample will be tested for drugs and the results
given to the judge or hearing commissioner for use at your bail hearing.
The test results will be used only to determine conditions of release in
your case. They cannot be used to determine whether you are guilty or
innocent of today's charges. If you choose not to provide a sample, the
Court may order you to provide one if and when you are released.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCY, PRETRIAL SERVICES TRAINING
AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 159 (1991). When an arrestee refuses to provide a urine
sample, the PSA representative is directed to remind the person that "the information from the test results will only be used to assist in setting release conditions."

3:

Id.
This limitation on the use of drug test results is based upon the PSA's enabling statute, which provides that: "Any information contained in the agency's
files . . . shall not be admissible on the issue of guilt in any judicial proceeding . . . but such information may be used . . . for the purpose of impeachment
in any subsequent proceeding." D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1303(d) (1989).
Based upon this provision, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in
Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1988), that positive drug tests are admissible at trial to impeach a defendant, such as where the defendant testifies
that he never used drugs or has no knowledge of them. The government can then
call a PSA representative to testify concerning the defendant's positive drug test(s).
ld.
While in a narrow sense the positive drug test is not introduced for the purpose of proving that the defendant committed the charged offense, the positive
result may be used (with potentially damaging effect) at defendant's trial to undercut the defendant's credibility. This is not explained clearly to defendants prior to
being asked to provide a urine sample. The information currently provided by
PSA appears to be seriously misleading in this regard. See text accompanying
notes 165-66, infra.
44.
A much higher percentage of arrestees refused to provide a sample in the
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view of the Director of PSA, this occurs because they have been
informed by the agency of the limited use that will be made of
the test results in the court proceedings. 45
The results of the drug test are generally available within
one or two hours, 46 and are communicated to the judicial officer presiding over the initial hearing for consideration in determining conditions of release. 47

B.

The EMIT Testing System

The Superior Court's drug testing program relies exclusively on the EMIT drug screening test. 48 The EMIT test is one of

federal program involving eight federal judicial districts. The overall refusal rate
was 13% in the first year of operation, and 23% in the second year. Final Report,
supra note 1, at 22. These high refusal rates may reflect the advice of counsel,
given to defendants in interviews prior to contact with the PSA representative. See
id. at 18. In D.C. Superior Court, the PSA representative contacts the defendant
prior to the interview with defense counsel. In light of the potential consequences
that a positive drug test can have, the best advice to a client may well be to "just
say no" to the drug test.
45.
CARVER, supra note 1, at 3.
46.
PSA conducts initial tests on an average of about 1,300 to 1,500 adult
arrestees each month, and about 300 to 400 juveniles. TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra
note 15, at 10. Most of the adults test positive for at least one drug. When the
program began in March 1984, 59% tested positive, which increased to the peak of
76% in February 1988. !d. at 17. This percentage has subsequently declined, and
for the period of June 1990 through July 1991, the percentage of adult arrestees
testing positive has been in the range of 50 to 58%. Monthly Memorandum from
John Carver to Interested Parties 1 (July 2, 1991). The rate of drug use for juvenile arrestees is substantially lower: 35% in 1987, 30% in 1988, and 25% in the
first half of 1989. TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 8.
47.
The PSA report to the judicial officer also contains information on the
arrestee's residence, family, employment, ties to the community, prior criminal
convictions, and pending charges. The PSA representative, or defense counsel, will
attempt to contact family or friends of the defendant to verify the information
provided.
D.C. Superior Court judicial officers make a "great deal of use" of PSA drug
test results, both in making initial release decisions and in monitoring compliance
with drug-related conditions of release. This was the conclusion of a survey of 25
judges and commissioners conducted in 1985, one year after the program was
established. See ToBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 42, at 5, 8. The same conclusion
was reached after a re-survey of the court's judicial officers in 1989. See TOBORG &
BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 22-23. According to the 1985 survey, one of the "most
striking" results of the PSA drug testing program was the increase in the number
of hearings held for violations of conditions of release, a result attributed by the
judicial officers to "(t]he availability of hard data from a reliable source, coupled
with the immediate availability of PSA staff to testify at violations hearings . . . ."
!d. at 8.
48.
The EMIT test, which is an acronym for Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay
Technique, was developed and is now marketed by the Syva Company of Palo Alto,
California.
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the quickest and cheapest drug tests available today, and it is
the most widely used drug screening test in the United
States. 49 It does not require sophisticated equipment or laboratory-trained personnel, and can be done on-site where the
urine samples are provided. 50
Each sample that tests positive is re-tested, using the same
EMIT test. 51 PSA does not confirm "positive" results with a
49.
ZEESE, supra note 10, at 2-7; Daniel P. Mazo, Yellow Rows of Test Tubes:
Due Process Constraints on Discharges of Public Employees Based on Drug Urinalysis Testing, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1623, 1642 (1987).
50.
The operation of the EMIT system has been described as follows:
Immunoassays are based on the principle of competition between labeled and unlabeled antigen (drug) for binding sites on a specific antibody. Antibodies are protein substances with sites on their surfaces to
which specific drugs or drug metabolites will bind. These antibodies are
formed by inoculating animals with appropriate immunogens.

*

*

*

In the EMIT assay, the label on the antigen is an enzyme (protein)
that produces a chemical reaction for detection of drugs. This detection is
based on the competition between unlabeled drug or drug metabolite and
labeled drug or drug metabolite for binding sites on the antibody. Urine
is mixed with a reagent containing [an enzyme substrate] and antibodies
to the drug, as well a second reagent containing a drug derivative labeled
with [the enzyme]. The enzyme-labeled drug when bound to an antibody
site is incapable of interacting with the [enzyme] substrate . . . . If the
enzyme-labeled drug does not bind to the antibody, then it is free to
react with the substrate. The drug in the subject's urine competes for the
limited number of antibody binding sites and thereby proportionally in·
creases the total enzyme activity. The enzymatic activity is therefore
directly related to the concentration of the drug present in the urine.
Richard Hawks, Analytical Methodology, in URINE TESTING FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE,
30-31 (Richard Hawks & C. Nora Chiang eds., NIDA Research Monograph No. 73,
1986). For a thorough discussion of the accuracy and reliability of the EMIT test,
see Lawrence Miike & Maria Hewitt, Accuracy and Reliability of Urine Drug Tests,
36 KAN. L. REV. 641 (1988). See generally John S. Goldkamp et al., Pretrial Drug
Testing and Defendant Risk, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 585 (1990).
51.
Urine tests are generally classified as either screening tests or confirmatory
tests. A screening test is the initial test used to detect drugs in urine. It is rapid
and less expensive, but not as accurate as confirmation tests. See CHRISTY VISHER
& KAREN MCFADDEN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., A COMPARISON OF URINALYSIS TECHNOLOGIES FOR DRUG TESTING IN CRIMINAL JUSI'ICE 3 (1991).
A confirmation test is a second test used to confirm positive results from an
initial screening test. It uses a different methodology, and provides a greater
margin of certainty. !d.
The most commonly used screening tests are enzyme multiplied immunoassay
(EMIT), radioimmunoassay (RIA), fluorescein immunoassay (TDx), and thin layer
chromatography (TLC). Miike & Hewitt, supra note 50, at 644-46.
Confirmation tests include gas chromatography, gas chromatography/mass
spectrometry (GC/MS), and high-performance liquid chromatography. The GC/MS
test is considered the most reliable state-of-the-art test. Confirmation by GC/MS
would result in a better than 99.9% reliability, and would "eliminate virtually all
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more specific (or selective) confirmatory test, as is done in the
great majority of other drug testing programs. 52 Mter the
sample is re-tested it is disposed of, and is not available if the
defendant later seeks re-testing by an alternative methodology.
Unconfirmed EMIT tests can produce erroneous results
due to both inherent limitations in the EMIT testing system
and operator or equipment error in the use of the system. Inherent limitations in the EMIT testing system result in both
"false positive" and "false negative" results. 53 There are several well-known inherent sources of false positive EMIT results.
First, substances in the urine sample besides the drug being
tested for can "cross-react," or give a positive result, when no
drug is present. In addition, even when a drug is present in a
defendant's urine, the drug could have been consumed in a
legal product, such as cough medicines or even poppy-seeded
bagels. In fact, a wide variety of substances have been found to
generate positive results for opiates, amphetamines, and other
controlled substances. 54 Analogues of PCP, 55 such as TCP,
false positive errors." See VISHER & McFADDEN, supra note 51, at 3.
See infra text accompanying notes 123-36. There have been a few instances
52.
in the past two years where PSA has sent urine samples which tested positive on
the EMIT test to an outside laboratory for confirmation by GC/MS. In these cases
where PSA voluntarily sought confirmation, the defendant had challenged the
initial positive results as false positives. Conversation with John Carver, Director
of the District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency (1991). The fact that PSA has
sought confirmation of EMIT results in a few isolated cases indicates that even
PSA recognizes that confirmation by GC/MS can provide significant additional
reliability of test results in contested cases.
53.
Visher and McFadden provide the following definitions:
False positive: a test result indicating positive for a given drug when
that drug is actually absent in a urine sample or present in concentrations below the designated cutoff level.
False negative: A negative test result for a given drug when that drug
is present in a sample above the cutoff level for the test.
Cutoff level: The concentration of a drug in urine, usually in
nanograms per milliliter (ng/mL), used to determine whether a specimen
is positive (at or above the cutoff level) or negative (below the cutoff
level) for the drug in question.
VISHER & MCFADDEN, supra note 51, at 3.
The Syva Company has acknowledged that codeine (a prescription pain
54.
killer), pholcodine (a cough syrup ingredient), and even poppy-seeded bagels will
yield a positive result on the EMIT opiate test; ephedrine (found in Nyquil and
other cold medications) and phenylopromanolamine (found in over sixty common
products such as Contac, Allerest, and St. Joseph Cold Tablets for Children) will
cross-react with the EMIT test for amphetamines. ZEESE, supra note 10, at A2-1,
quoting from Syva filing with the General Accounting Office. For an extensive
listing of the array of substances that have been found to cross-react with the
EMIT test used by PSA, see id. at A2-1 through A2-3.
55.
Analogues are chemical compounds with similar but slightly different
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could cause a false positive EMIT test result. 56 Another type
of error leading to false positive results occurs when urine
samples contain an enzyme that can mimic the one used in the
EMIT test. 57
These sources of error are unavoidable using the EMIT
methodology. They cannot be eliminated by flawless operation
of the system, or by a second "confirmatory" EMIT test of the
same sample, as is now done by PSA. For example, a urine
sample containing a cross-reactive substance will always give a
positive EMIT result. Moreover, the frequency of these inherent
errors is difficult to estimate, for it derives from the randomness of machine error and the idiosyncrasies of the urine content of the tested population.
A second class of error is due not to the inherent unreliability of the EMIT system but to poor operation or deliberate
subversion. 58 For example, false positive results will occur if
the equipment is not properly calibrated or carefully cleaned
after each test. 59 In laboratories which use only the EMIT

structures. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th
Cir. 1972).
56.
United States v. Roy, 113 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2317, 2320 (D.C. Sup. Ct.
Sep. 24, 1985) (quoting testimony of Syva Co. employee).
57.
John P. Morgan, Problems of Mass Urine Screening {or Misused Drugs, 16
J. P&'YCHOACTIVE DRUGS 305, 317 (1984).
58.
Robert Blanke makes the following observation:
Errors of omission as well as commission occur in all human activities. Fatigue, poor health, and boredom arising from the tedium of routine
tasks all contribute to high error rates. Providing good working conditions, effective rest periods, and rotation of workers through different
tasks can help to alleviate these problems . . . .
Inappropriate training or experience for the task being carried out can
also lead to errors . . . .
The most difficult errors to control are administrative ones. Labeling
errors, spelling errors, transposition of numbers, all can lead to a correct
test result being assigned to the wrong subject. In fact, most laboratories
have learned by participating in external PT programs that these occur
more frequently than errors in testing procedures.
Robert Blanke, Accuracy in Urinalysis, in URINE TESTING FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE, at
50 (Richard Hawks & C. Nora Chiang eds., NIDA Research Monograph No. 73,
1986).
59.
This might occur if a urine sample which contained PCP or another drug
was tested in the EMIT equipment and then not all the residue from that sample
was cleaned from the equipment. The next sample tested could have a false
positive result because of the drug contained in the prior urine sample.
False positive results are also caused by contamination of samples or equipment, improper calibration, inadequate maintenance of the equipment, temperature
variations, or failures in the chain-of-custody system. The very ease of performing
these tests belies the care with which they must be done, and the consequent
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test, the many mistakes which can result from not carefully
following the proper procedures are magnified by the absence of
an appropriate confirmation test.

C.

Overall Reliability of EMIT

There has been a great deal of controversy over the reliability and accuracy of the EMIT test and the other
immunoassays. On one extreme is a recent study comparing
the reliability of the EMIT system with three other screening
tests. This study found that both false positives and false negatives varied widely for the different testing systems; EMIT's
false positive rate went as high as 2.5 percent for cocaine and

reliance on persons who are not trained to laboratory standards may lead to an
under-appreciation of the danger of cross-reactivity and the importance of other
potential threats to the accuracy of the tests. For example, in United States v. Roy,
the defense introduced PSA log sheets which reflected sloppy and careless operations of the system in Superior Court:
The defense, however, introduced the log sheets on which the computer values were recorded in the tests run on the defendant's urine from
October 18, 1984, through December 19, 1984, a total of sixteen weekly
tests. On six of these log sheets, there is no indication in the space provided that the calibration tests were performed. Additionally, defendant
points out that on eight log sheets the operator failed to record completely the time when the test was begun and ended. The defendant also
points to three log sheets on which no negative calibrations were recorded.
United States v. Roy, 114 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2481, 2488 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Oct. 6,
1986). There was also the case reported in the press of a defendant who allegedly
bribed PSA employees to have his urine test results reported as negative when
they were actually positive. See Bribery Accusations Probed in D.C. Drug Screening
Unit, WASHINGTON POST, July 12, 1988, at B1; Defendant Back in Jail Over Positive Drug Test, WASHINGTON POST, July 14, 1988, at B3. PSA employees could also
be bribed to report negative test results as positive, if, for example, a competing
drug dealer wished to get his competitor off the streets.
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2.2 percent for the opiates. 60
Many authorities believe that the estimate of EMIT's accuracy at ninety-seven or ninety-eight percent represents ideal
laboratory conditions which are not often met in the "real
world." 61 There have been a variety of published studies which
have documented false positive error rates for EMIT in prisons
and other testing contexts in the range of four percent to thir-

60.
Visher and McFadden document the following false positive rates in their
study of EMIT testing. VISHER & McFADDEN, supra note 51, at 3.

False Positive Rates* by Drug Type
Percent Incorrect positives

5
4

3

2

0
Opiates

-

Cocaine

Marijuana

PCP

Amphetamines

RIA r:::::J EMIT CJ TDx IO.'S:! TLC

*Negative by GC/MS but positive by screening test

61.
See ZEESE, supra note 10, at §§ 3.01-3.05. The problem of inaccurate testing
is not limited to drug tests. Studies have also documented substantial error rates
by forensic laboratories which analyze other items such as blood, hair, and paint.
See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 109, 109-24 (1991).
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ty-eight percent. 62

62.
The following studies involved false positive rates for EMIT. Many of the
highest false positive rates were from laboratories which ran only a single EMIT
test, and did not repeat the test for positive samples. The complete citations to the
studies follow the chart:

Date

Study

False Positive %

1981
1982
1982
1984
1984
1984
1984
1985
1985
1986

O'Connor and Rejent•
Center for Human Toxicologl
Whiting and Manders'
Center for Disease Controld
N.J. Dept. of Corrections•
Jones et alf
Black et aF
Sutheimer et al.h
Frederick et aJ.i
Fort Meadei

15%
11% and 38%
33%
4%
25%
34%
28%
4.6%
7%
4%

• Janice E. O'Connor & Thomas A. Rejent, EMIT Cannabinoid Assay:
Confirmation by RIA and GC/MS, 5 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOL. 168, 168-73
(1981).
b Michael Peat et al., Laboratory Evaluation of Immunoassay Kits for
the Detection of Cannabinoids in Biological Fluids, in THE ANALYSIS OF
CANNABINOIDS IN BIOLOGICAL FLUIDS, at 85-98 (Richard Hawks ed., NIDA
Monograph No. 42, 1982).

' John D. Whiting & William W. Manders, Confirmation of a Tetrahydrocannabinol Metabolite in Urine by Gas Chromatography, 6 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOL. 49, 49-52 (1982).
d Center for Disease Control, Survey of Laboratories, cited in Peranzo
v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504, 1511 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
• Morgan, supra note 57, at 305-17.
r A. Jones et al., Analysis of the Major Metabolite of Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol in Urine N: A Comparison of Five Methods, 8 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOL. 249, 249-51 (1984).
g David L. Black et al., Urine Cannabinoid Analysis:
An Integrated
Multi-method Approach, 8 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOL. 224, 224-27 (1984).

h C.A. Sutheimer et al., Detection and Confirmation of Urinary
Cannabinoids, 9 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOL. 156, 156-59 (1985).
i David L. Frederick et al., Comparison of Six Cannabinoid Metabolite
Assays, 9 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOL. 116, 116-20 (1985).

i Marshal L. Abercrombie & John S. Jewell, Evaluation of EMIT and
RIA High Volume Test Procedures for THC Metabolites in Urine Utilizing
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Studies of the performance of commercial testing laboratories around the country by the Federal Centers for Disease
Control demonstrate that, in actual practice, error rates for
drug testing can be in the range of twenty to fifty percent, including false negatives and false positives. At least one such
laboratory actually reached a one-hundred percent error
rate. 63
Clearly, there have been very wide variances in the expertise with which different laboratories perform screening tests.
It is also likely that there will be wide variances in the reliability of screening tests as administered in different pretrial testing programs.
Ill.

DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law." This provision is applicable to both the federal and District of Columbia governments, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a similar mandate on the states. 64
One of the central purposes of due process protections is to
ensure fair procedures that minimize the risk of arbitrary or

GC/MS Confirmation, 10 J. ANALYTICAL TOXlCOL. 178, 178-80 (1986).
63.
Hugh Hansen et al., Crisis in Drug Testing: Results of CDC Blind Study,
253 J. AMER. MED. Ass'N 2382 (1985). This blind study of thirteen laboratories in
the United States which served a total of 262 methadone treatment facilities, found
the following false positive results:
Drug

False Positive Rate of Up to:

Barbiturates

6%

Amphetamines

37%

Methadone

66%

Cocaine

6%

Codeine

7%

Morphine

10%

See generally Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977). The Su64.
preme Court has often cited precedents involving federal and state due process
protections interchangeably. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 74649 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263-65 (1989).
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erroneous decisions. 65 This has often been referred to as "procedural" due process, as distinguished from so-called "substantive" due process, and it has come to hold a position of great
importance in American jurisprudence. 66 The goal is to minimize the risk of arbitrary or erroneous decisions to the extent
feasible; insuring an error-free process is, of course, impossible.67
Current Supreme Court doctrine applies a two-step analysis to determine the scope of due process protections in a given
situation. The first step is to determine whether the individual
has a protected interest in the nature of "liberty" or "property"
which can be adversely affected by govemment action. In making this determination, the Court will "look not to the 'weight'
but to the nature of the interest at stake."68 As long as the "deprivation is 'not de minimis,' its gravity is irrelevant to the
question of whether" due process protections apply. 69
65.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 558 (1974).
See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746, 752; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
66.
347 (1943) ("The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of
procedural safeguards."); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
11:14, at 402-03 (2d ed. 1979).
See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) ("There is always in
67.
litigation a margin of error, representing error in fact-finding, which both parties
must take into account."). The Court in Mackey v. Montrym emphasized that:
[T]he Due Process Clause has never been construed to require that
the procedures used to guard against an erroneous deprivation of a
protectible "property" or "liberty" interest be so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of error. The Due Process Clause simply does not
mandate that all governmental decisionmaking comply with standards
that assure perfect, error-free determinations.
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (citation omitted).
68.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); see Kentucky Dep't
of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
The prior Supreme Court test for determining whether due process protections
apply to a given situation was a one-step process which balanced the weight of the
individual's interests against the interests of the government. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (no due process protections
where government's interests in security of a military base outweighed a civilian
restaurant employee's interest in employment at that specific job).
This older one-step balancing process to determine whether due process
protections apply is quite similar to the current Supreme Court's balancing test to
determine whether a search conducted under "special circumstances" is reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (both upholding the drug testing of certain government
employees, because the government's interest in the testing of the employees was
greater than the employees' privacy interests).
69.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71;
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If interests in the nature of "liberty" or "property" are
found to be involved, the Court must then determine what process is due, i.e., what procedural protections are required under
the circumstances. It has often been stated that due process "is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." 70
The framework for determining what process is required
was set out in Mathews v. Eldridge. 71 It focuses on three factors:
[l]dentification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the government's interest, including the function in-

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
70.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); McElroy, 367 U.S. at 895.
The procedural protections in dispute in due process cases are typically the
right to notice of governmental action and to a hearing to present one's side of the
controversy before the governmental action is taken. Depending on the circumstances, due process may require that at the hearing the individual has the right to
participate orally or in writing, be represented by an attorney, the right to an
independent decisionmaker, and/or a statement of reasons for the government's
decision. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (rights in a hearing to
trapsfer prisoner to a mental hospital); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(rights in a proceeding to withhold welfare benefits).
The earlier Supreme Court cases did not formulate the issue by focusing so
much on the precise degree of procedural protections required by due process, but
looked at the issue as more of an "either-or" issue of requiring notice and a
hearing before any grievous deprivation of liberty or property. Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11 (1908); Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915).
One traditional exception to the requirement of a hearing is the so-called
"testing exception," which has been codified in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 554(a)(3) (1966 & Supp. 1991). This provision exempts from the general
requirement of an on-the-record hearing all "proceedings in which decisions rest
solely on inspections, tests, or elections." See DAVIS, supra note 66, at 445-49; cf
Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (dismissal of medical student); Whitfield v. Illinois Board of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d
474, 478 n.12 (7th Cir. 1974) (failure on bar examination).
The justification for this exception is that certain issues are best resolved not
by holding an evidentiary hearing, but by an examination or inspection by experts
in that field. Of course, any action taken by the government on the basis of its
examination which adversely effects a protected interest would still have to comply
with due process, including the right of an aggrieved party to challenge the fairness or accuracy of the examination. See APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 558(b), 702 (1966)
(judicial review).
71.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 72

This test is essentially a type of cost/benefit analysis. It
originated and was first applied in the area of administrative
law, such as the termination of disability payments involved in
Mathews v. Eldridge, but it has since been applied by the Supreme Court to a number of proceedings which are part of the
criminal justice process, including the bail decision made at the
initial hearing, 73 and to several other proceedings which can
be characterized as quasi-criminal in nature. 74
There has been substantial scholarly criticism of constitutional balancing tests in general, and of the Mathews v.
Eldridge test in particular. With respect to constitutional balancing tests generally, it has been argued that such tests lack
objectivity, requiring judges to apply their subjective determinations of what "weight" is to be accorded to the different interests involved, 75 and ultimately resulting in a devaluation of
fundamental rights. 76
The Mathews v. Eldridge test has also been criticized on a
number of specific grounds. Several commentators have criticized the test for focusing on only "instrumental" judgments

72.
Id. at 335.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 752 (1987) (bail hearing for
73.
adult defendants); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 274 (1984) (bail hearing for
juveniles). The Mathews v. Eldridge test has even been applied to determine
whether due process requires the assistance of a psychiatrist in the trial of an
indigent defendant with a substantial insanity defense. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68, 78-79 (1985).
74.
For example, many cases have employed the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis
to determine the scope of due process rights which must be accorded to incarcerated persons. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (conditions of confinement imposed upon pretrial detainees); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)
(procedures applicable to treatment of mentally ill prisoners with antipsychotic
drugs against their will). The Mathews v. Eldridge test was also applied to determine what process was due prior to the suspension of a driver's license because of
refusal to take a breath-analysis test upon arrest for drunken driving. Mackey v.
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979). An individual has a substantial protected "property"
interest in retaining a driver's license. Id. at 10-11.
75.
Nadine Stossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting
the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1173, 1184-86 (1988); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 972-95 (1987).
76.
See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 776-77 (1964); Stossen, supra note 75, at 1184-86. See also Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Fourth Amendment
Implications of Urine Testing For Evidence of Drug Use in Probation, 55 BROOK. L.
REV. 1159, 1200 (1990).
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about the accuracy of a proceeding, looking only toward what
the ultimate impact the protection will have on the outcome of
the proceeding. 77 In this view, the Mathews v. Eldridge test
reflects the Supreme Court's "almost exclusively instrumental
vision" in deciding the proper role for due process
protections. 78 This ignores the importance of the "intrinsic"
due process principles of insuring the opportunity to participate
in governmental actions that adversely affect an individual,
and other values inherent in fair treatment by the government.79
A second critique of the Mathews v. Eldridge test is that it
is too blunt an instrument, because it seeks to quantify factors
that cannot be quantified and eliminates from consideration
unquantifiable factors that may be the most important factors
in the core concept of procedural fairness. 80 Mathews v.
Eldridge has also been criticized, by then-Associate Justice
Rehnquist, on the general ground, cited above, that it involves
an essentially unprincipled, ad hoc weighing of interests. 81
The area of pretrial drug testing offers a useful vantage
point to evaluate these criticisms. Insuring the reliability of
drug testing results under the due process clause would seem
to involve essentially instrumental judgments, which the
Mathews v. Eldridge equation was designed to resolve. This
article considers how useful the equation is in resolving the
scope of due process protections. 82

77.
Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 793-94
(1990).
LAURENCE H. TRIRE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7, at 671 (2d ed.
78.
1988).
ld. at 674 (instrumental approach not only overlooks the important human
79.
interest "in receiving decent treatment, but also provides the Court a facile means
to justify the most cursory procedures by altering the relative weights to be
accorded each of the three factors").
80.
Professor Mashaw has argued that the Mathews v. Eldridge test "tends, as
cost-benefit analyses typically do, to 'dwarf soft variables' and to ignore complexities and ambiguities." Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 48 (1976).
81.
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 562 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The balance is simply an ad hoc weighing which
depends to a great extent upon how the Court subjectively views the underlying
interests at stake.").
See discussion infra part VII.
82.
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DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS APPLY TO PRETRIAL DRUG
TESTING

The first question to be addressed is whether due process
protections apply at all to pretrial drug testing. Clearly such
protections do apply, because pretrial drug testing involves
fundamental "liberty" interests. 83
The overriding liberty interest involved is that of not being
incarcerated as a result of a judicial proceeding. Every individual who tests positive for drugs, prior to the initial hearing, or
while on pretrial release, runs the risk of incarceration as a
result.
The Supreme Court has often held that incarceration infringes the most fundamental and basic "liberty" interest protected by due process. 84 The Court has specifically found that
due process protections apply to the decision made at the initial
bail hearing to release or detain both adults and juveniles
without bond. 85 Indeed, even persons on probation and parole
have a "liberty" interest in their "conditional freedom" which
requires due process protections. 86 Persons who have been
confined in jail prior to trial also have a continuing "liberty"
interest which requires due process protections relating to the
conditions of their confinement. 87 Protected liberty or property
interests have also been found to require due process
protections for far less severe sanctions than incarceration. 88
Incarceration is the harshest sanction that can be imposed

83.
It would be possible to make an attenuated argument that "property"
interests are also involved in the potential loss of pretrial liberty as a result of
drug testing. Cf Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) ("Pretrial confinement
may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family
relationships."). However, this would serve little purpose because the "liberty"
interest is so clear.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977); Board of Regents v. Roth,
84.
408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
85.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 274-77 (1984).
86.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation).
87.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 530 (1979) (approving conditions of confinement imposed on federal pretrial detainees, including body-cavity searches, as
satisfying due process standards).
88.
For example, corporal punishment in public schools implicates a protected
liberty interest, Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672. Even loss of a driver's license implicates a protected property interest requiring due process protections. Mackey v.
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1979).
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on an individual in the District of Columbia. The District does
not have laws authorizing capital punishment, 89 and there is
no provision in the District's laws for sentencing an individual
to prison with aggravating conditions, such as imprisonment at
"hard labor." Thus, a period of incarceration is the harshest
penalty that can be imposed. 90 Pretrial incarceration is especially onerous, not only because of its drastic impact on the
defendant's freedom, but also because it often has a substantial
impact on the defendant's ability to assist in his or her defense.91
Even if incarceration is not imposed as a result of a positive drug test, the judicial officer at the initial hearing routinely imposes some other substantial restraint on liberty, such as
the requirement that the defendant return every week to provide a urine sample at the courthouse. A recent study has
shown that if a defendant was reported to have tested positive
at the initial hearing, the judicial officer in the District will
condition release on compliance with regular drug testing procedures '"all" or "almost all" of the time. 92

89.
Capital punishment was eliminated in the District in 1981, see D.C. Law 3113, § 2, 27 D.C. Reg. 5624 (Feb. 26, 1981) (amending D.C. CoDE ANN. § 22-2404
(1973)), to provide for the current mandatory penalty of 20 years to life imprisonment for first degree murder. See generally United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d
1333, 1365 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976) (imposing life-imprisonment for felony murder).
90.
Defendants incarcerated by a D.C Superior Court judge can be detained in
the jail facility located in the District, in one of several correctional facilities
located in nearby Lorton, Virginia, or in local jails in states as far away as Washington State (on a contractual basis). The determination of where each defendant
will be placed is generally made by the D.C. Department of Corrections. The
determination of when a defendant shall be released on parole is usually made by
the D.C. Board of Parole (for sentences longer than 180 days). See D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 24-208 (1989).
91.
The defendant who has been detained pretrial has been "hindered in his
ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense."
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972); see also Campbell v. McGruder, 580
F.2d 521, 531-32 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting the "disturbing evidence" that the defendant at liberty pending trial is more likely to be found not guilty, and if convicted,
of not receiving a prison sentence).
92.
TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 22-23. There are limited circumstances where a documented history of positive drug test results could be beneficial
to a defendant, such as in qualifying for the so-called "addict exception" at sentencing. This allows the judge to waive stiff mandatory minimum sentences for certain
offenses if the defendant was "addicted" to drugs when the offense was committed,
and if other conditions are satisfied. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(c)(2) (1989), and
supra note 29. A documented positive test result on the date of arrest (and even
thereafter) could substantially assist the defendant in establishing an addiction to
drugs.
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Another "liberty" interest implicated by drug testing is the
stigmatizing consequences such testing can have on an
individual's reputation. 93 Two types of stigmatization are involved. First, there is the stigma of being labeled a drug user
in an official court file. This court file is a public record
available to any person upon request, including prospective
employers and government officials who are conducting a check
on the defendant, even after the case is concluded. 94 This stigmatizing effect of a positive drug test could be eliminated if the
test results were not included in the written PSA report but
were instead provided to the judicial officer orally by the PSA
representative. This is not now done in the District. 95 A sec-

However, the defendant has several other ways of documenting an addiction
which do not pose the risks created by pretrial drug testing, particularly the
punitive sanctions that may be imposed on the addicted defendant pretrial. These
include letters or reports from drug programs to which the defendant has been
referred, testimony by family members or others associated with the defendant's
addiction, the defendant's prior criminal arrest records, and the defendant's own
testimony.
See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (stigma of being
93.
publicly labeled as an excessive drinker in notices placed in state liquor stores);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
573 (1972); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (stigmatizing consequences of
the transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital).
94.
Most persons would equate a positive drug test result with being a drug
user. The PSA report, which is included in the official case jacket in court, specifies that the defendant tested positive or negative for drugs, but it does not specify
the specific drug or drugs for which the defendant tested positive.
This lack of specificity as to which drug caused the positive result does not
offer any substantial protection to the defendant, because the defendant is still
labeled and stigmatized as a user of illegal drugs. Cf. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at
437 (stigmatization occurred when "unsavory label" of being an excessive drinker
placed on individual by state officials). But see Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420,
441-44 (1960) (no violation of liberty interests for stigmatizing consequences of
government agency report).
95.
Without much difficulty, the PSA representative could orally inform the
judicial officer at the initial hearing of the drug test results. This could be done at
the bench, in the presence of defense counsel and the prosecutor, as is now done
for any record of juvenile adjudications of the defendant known to PSA. Alternatively, the drug test results could be submitted on a supplemental PSA report,
which would not become part of the official case file. This system is followed now
for informing the trial judge of the results of all drug testing which occurs after
the initial hearing. The report is submitted in writing to the trial court, with
copies to defense counsel and the prosecutor, but is generally not placed in the
official court file, although it may be retained in the judge's private file on the
case in the judge's chambers. See TOBORG & BELLASSAJ, supra note 15, at 25.
The Supreme Court has indicated in connection with the stigma that can flow
from a juvenile proceeding: "The more comprehensive and effective the procedures
used to prevent public disclosure of the finding, the less the danger of stigma." In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, ::l67 n.5 (1970). The same principle would also apply to
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ond type of stigmatization is that which results from the incarceration or conviction of a defendant based upon a positive
drug test. 96
These stigmatizing effects of drug testing, 97 considered in
conjunction with the other "liberty" interests involved, clearly
require that due process protections apply to pretrial drug
testing programs. The next question is what process is due to
insure the reliability of pretrial drug testing.
V.

THE NEED TO CONFIRM EMIT TESTS

The principal due process issue raised by the District's
pretrial drug testing program is whether a positive result on
the EMIT screening test must be confirmed by a more reliable
confirmation test. There have been no reported court decisions
on this issue, 98 but there have been a large number of cases
(and much controversy) concerning the need to confirm initial
screening tests such as EMIT in related contexts, including
probation revocation, prison disciplinary proceedings, and loss
of employment.
An analysis of confirmatory testing should begin, not by
addressing the abstract issue of whether confirmation is required of pretrial drug testing, but instead by focusing on four
specific circumstances where confirmation may or may not be
required, i.e., in contempt proceedings, in hearings to modify
conditions of release, at the initial bail hearing, and at sentencing. Mter each of these situations is analyzed separately, consideration can then be given to the similarities and differences

pretrial drug testing results.
96.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
The individual facing the greatest threat of stigmatization is the person
97.
facing a show cause hearing for contempt as the result of a positive drug test. Not
only does this individual face up to six months incarceration and a fine, but also a
permanent record of a conviction for criminal contempt of court. See supra text
accompanying notes 33-35. Even though pretrial incarceration in D.C. Superior
Court infrequently lasts in excess of six months, the additional sanction of a
permanent criminal record would appear to make a contempt conviction the greatest threat to hberty interests posed by pretrial drug testing.
98.
In one recent case in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the principal issue was whether due process requires confirmation of EMIT tests in contempt
proceedings. However, the Court never reached this issue because the United
States conceded error on an alternative ground r~Jised in the appeal, and the Court
vacated the contempt conviction on this basis. Henderson v. United States, No. 88155 (D.C. Jan. 18, 1989) (mem.) (granting motion to remand filed by the United
States on Jan. 11, 1989). The author of this article was counsel for Mr. Henderson
in that case.
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in these circumstances, in an attempt to formulate a general
rule indicating when confirmation is required by due process.

A.

Contempt Proceedings

1. Applying Mathews v. Eldridge
Contempt proceedings provide the most compelling context
for confirmation of EMIT tests. Applying the Mathews v.
Eldridge equation, the first factor to be considered is the
defendant's interests. Here, there can be no question that the
defendant's fundamental liberty interests in freedom from incarceration and stigmatization are entitled to great weight. 99
The Supreme Court has indicated that the defendant's interest
in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding is "almost uniquely
compelling." 100
On the other side of the equation is the government's interest in minimizing the fiscal burden that confirmation of positive drug tests imposes. In these days when most court systems, including the District's, are operating on tight budgets, 101 any additional expenditure of funds is a matter of
concern. However, the cost of confirming drug tests used in contern pt proceedings is de minimis com pared to overall pretrial

99.
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) ("[T]he juvenile's countervailing
interest in freedom from institutional restraints, even for the brief time involved
here, is undoubtedly substantial."); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750
(1987) ("On the other side of the scale, of course, is the individual's strong interest
in liberty. We do not minimize the importance and fundamental nature of this
right.").
While the length of the period of incarceration may effect the weight of defendant's interests, even a "brief" period of incarceration involves "undoubtedly substantial" interests. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. at 265; cf Mackey v. Montrym, 44:3 U.S.
1, 12 (1979) ("The duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation of a property
interest is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action."). The
defendant convicted of criminal contempt for drug use faces a substantial period of
incarceration of up to six months. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
The defendant's interest in avoiding the stigma of a permanent conviction record for criminal contempt is similarly compelling.
100.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1985). The Court commented that:
The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that
places an individual's life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling.
Indeed, the host of safeguards fashioned by this Court over the years to
diminish the risk of erroneous conviction stands as a testament to that
concern. The interest of the individual in the outcome of the State's effort
to overcome the presumption of innocence is obvious and weighs heavily
in our analysis.
!d.
101.
CARVEH, supra note 1, at 6.
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drug testing costs. It is likely that there will be only a relative
handful of contempt proceedings that require confirmatory
testing, because Superior Court judges rarely initiate contempt
proceedings for violation of conditions of release, preferring the
less drastic and procedurally simpler options available to
thP-m. 102 For the small number of show cause hearings initiated on the basis of positive drug tests, the great majority of defendants concede drug use, 103 thereby eliminating any need to
confirm these tests (since the defendants have "confirmed"
them). 104 Indeed, using reliable confirmation tests may actually decrease the number of defendants who contest positive
EMIT results, because they know they will be faced with results of tests which are virtually foolproof.
The number of drug tests involved in contested show cause
hearings are only a very small fraction of the drug tests administered by PSA, 105 and the expense of confirming these positive tests with state-of-the-art confirmation tests would not be
great. 106 Such confirmation could be done "without prohibitive

102.
TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 25.
TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 42, at 8.
103.
104.
There is no need to confirm positive drug tests if the defendant admits use
and doesn't challenge the accuracy of the result. See In re Johnston, 745 P.2d 864,
865 (Wash. 1987) (en bane); Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226, 232 (W.D. Ky.
1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Higgs v. Bland, 888 F.2d 443 (6th Cir.
1989).
The potential financial burden of confirmation testing includes not only the
105.
cost of the confirmation test itself, but any additional expense involved in retaining
and storing urine samples for possible later re-testing.
Of course, if the defendant assumes the responsibility for paying all the expenses involved in the confirmation test, the government would have little (if any)
interest in opposing such confirmation. However, this is not an available alternative in the overwhelming majority of cases in D.C. Superior Court, which involve
indigent defendants. In these cases, confirmation must be done at government
expense if it is done at all.
106.
It costs PSA less than $3 to test each sample today; when the District's
program began, it cost approximately $7 to test each sample. Conversation with
John Carver, Director of the District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency (1991);
CARVER, supra note 1, at 6. Confirmation using the most reliable testing method
(GC/MS) costs between $25 and $80, depending on the laboratory involved, and
there would likely be a discount on this price based upon a contract with a laboratory for bulk amounts of confirmation tests. See JOHN CLARK, ESTIMATING THE
COSTS OF DRUG TESTING FOR A PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAM (1989) (cost of
GC/MS confirmation was $25 per test for the Multnomah County, Oregon, pretrial
drug testing progtam); Kaye McDonald Sutherland & Coni Rathbone, Jar Wars:
Drug Testing in the Workplace, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 529, 540 n.99 (1987);
Alexander Stille, DRUG TESTING: The Scene is Set For a Dramatic Legal Collision Between the Rights of Employers and Workers, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 23;
Charles E. Leal, Comment, Admissibility of Biochemical Urinalysis Testing Results

314

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

lVolume 5

cost" to the PSA program. 107
The governmental interests balanced as part of the
Mathews v. Eldridge equation are only those involved with
providing an additional confirmatory test, not interests served
by drug testing generally. These general governmental interests would have been considered under the old one-step due
process balancing test 108 (and under the current Fourth
Amendment balancing test), but the Mathews v. Eldridge test
focuses only on the burdens involved with the additional procedural protections in dispute.
Thus, while the government has an obvious and substantial interest in insuring that defendants comply with courtordered conditions of release, especially those requiring the
For the Purpose of Detecting Marijuana Use, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 396-97
(1984).
The cost of confirming positive results is also very small compared to the total
costs involved in a pretrial drug testing program. For example, the pilot demonstration pretrial drug testing program established in eight federal judicial districts
in 1989 used an initial immunoassay screening test, and confirmation at an outside
laboratory using GC or an equivalent technique if any adverse action was to be
taken against a defendant. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-2. The costs to set up
and operate the immunoassay testing was $845,520, and the cost of confirmation
testing was only $21,000 (less than 2.5 percent of the total costs). ld. at 8. This
report also contained cost projections for nationwide implementation of pretrial
drug testing in all federal district courts. According to one model for such nationwide implementation, the initial costs to set up the program would be $6,865,000,
the recurring costs would be $10,801,037, but the cost of laboratory confirmation
would be only $90,000 per year. ld. at 63-64. Confirmation costs would thus be
less than one percent of all recurring costs.
Similar estimates of costs were made for state pretrial drug testing programs
in CLARK, supra. According to one model, the yearly cost for a pretrial testing
program was in excess of $818,000, of which only $15,750 was for confirmation of
positive drug test results by GC/MS whenever the defendant's release could be
revoked on the basis of a positive drug test. ld. at 14-17. Confirmation costs were
less than 2% under this model.
107.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975). The Supreme Court has also used
other formulations to indicate the role of costs in determining the scope of constitutional protections. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 480 U.S. 817, 825 (1977) ("[T]he
cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial."); Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 (1977) ("[E]ven if the need for advance procedural
safeguards were clear, the question would remain whether the incremental benefit
would justify the cost."). See generally TRIBE, supra note 78, at 715-16.
108.
Under the procedure announced in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union
v. McElroy, 867 U.S. 886 (1961), the court would have weighed the importance to
the government of having drug testing against the interests of the defendant in
not wrongfully having his or her liberty restrained as a result of a testing error.
Under the newer procedure, the court is to weigh the burden on the government of
providing the additional confirmatory test against the estimated wrongful loss to
the individual of his or her liberty resulting from a mistake correctable by the
confirmatory test.
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defendant not to violate the law while on pretrial release, this
interest is not relevant to the question of whether due process
requires confirmation of EMIT tests.
The government also has a strong interest in insuring that
defendants with pending cases do not use illicit drugs while
free on pretrial release because such drug use could affect the
defendant's ability to appear in court, or threaten the safety of
the community. There is a growing, but still inconclusive, body
of empirical data documenting the relationship between pretrial drug use and both failure to appear, and commission of new
offenses by defendants while on pretrial release. 109 While the
causal relationships between drug use and failure to appear or
commission of new offenses is still subject to vigorous scholarly
debate, 110 the Supreme Court has made it clear that a definitive answer is not necessary before these government interests
can be factored into a Fourth Amendment analysis. 111
Sufficient data currently exists to enable the government
to appropriately assert these interests in the Fourth Amendment context. Indeed, the government's interest in seeking to
protect the public health and safety has traditionally been
accorded great weight. 112 These interests are not, however,

109.
See studies cited in Abell, supra note 1, at 944, 950-51 & n.6; Rosen &
Goldkamp, supra note 10, at 114-15 & ns. 2-4; John S. Goldkamp et a!., Pretrial
Drug Testing and Defendant Risk, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 585, 586-87, 59099 (1990).
110.
Compare Goldkamp et al., supra note 109, and Rosen & Goldkamp, supra
note 10, with Abell, supra note 1, and CARVER, supra note 1.
111.
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
[A)ppellees claim, and the District Court agreed, that it is virtually
impossible to predict future criminal conduct with any degree of accuracy . . . . Our cases indicate, however, that from a legal point of view
there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct. Such a judgement forms an important element in many
decisions . . . .
!d., 467 U.S. at 278 (footnote omitted).
112.
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (removing drunken drivers from
the highways).
A number of thoughtful commentators have recently challenged the wisdom of
using criminal laws to control America's serious drug abuse problem, and have
suggested alternative approaches, including legalization and decriminalization of
drugs. These commentators include United States District Judge Robert W. Sweet
and former Secretary of State George P. Shultz. See DRUG POLICY FOUNDATION,
DRUG PROHIBITION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF NATIONS 24-25, 205-08 (Arnold S.
Trebach & Kevin B. Zeese eds., 1990). However, as long as criminal laws against
illicit drug use remain in effect, the government can certainly assert a substantial
interest in their enforcement in appropriate contexts (such as the search and seizure area), but not in support of a policy which unfairly imprisons innocent people
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relevant to the due process concern over confirmation of EMIT
tests.
The defendant's appearance in court and the protection of
the public are not the only relevant government interests. The
government, like the defendant, also has a compelling interest
in insuring the accuracy of criminal dispositions. Unlike private
litigants, the government's interest in prevailing at trial is
"necessarily tempered by its interest in the fair and accurate
adjudication of criminal cases." 113 Moreover, the government
has an interest in insuring that the program is perceived as
fair, and not an error-prone system resulting in unjustified
jailing. These governmental interests further support the need
for confirmation testing.
Final factors to be considered in the Mathews v. Eldridge
equation are the risk of an erroneous determination using only
the EMIT test, and the increased reliability that would result
from confirmation testing. There is agreement in the scientific
community that confirmation of immunoassays like EMIT with
GC/MS results in reliability exceeding 99.9 percent, when proper procedures are followed. 114 In other words, confirmation of
positive EMIT results with GC/MS virtually eliminates accuracy concerns. With such confirmation courts can confidently
equate positive drug test results with drug usage.
When an EMIT test is unconfirmed, courts do not enjoy
such confidence because the margin of error for unconfirmed
EMIT tests is subject to frequent dispute. As noted above,
some authorities claim that false positive rates for unconfirmed
EMIT tests range from two to five percent. Other studies of
EMIT testing programs have shown far higher false positive
rates. 115 While the precise rate of false positives in the
District's program has apparently never been determined nor

simply to save a relatively small amount of money.
113.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 4 71, 484 (1972) (noting the state's interest in "not having parole revoked
because of erroneous information").
See VJSHER & MCFADDEN, supra note 51, at 3; American Fed'n of Gov.
114.
Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 729 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Mark Rust, Drug
Testing: The Legal Dilemma, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1986, at 52; John Edward Failla,
Note, A Proposal for Mandatory Drug Testing of Federal Civilian Employees, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 322, 330 n.65 (1987).
115.
See supra note 62, showing false positive rates in published studies of up
to 25% by the New Jersey Department of Corrections; 28% in the study by Black
et a!.; 34% in the study by Jones et a!.; and 38% in the Center for Human Toxicology study.
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publicly reported, 116 even assuming a five percent false positive rate, one of every twenty persons convicted of a drug-use
violation would have been wrongly convicted. This would constitute a substantial and unnecessary number of persons who
have been wrongfully convicted of criminal contempt.
Application of the Mathews v. Eldridge test leads to the
conclusion that due process requires confirmation of positive
EMIT tests in contested contempt proceedings. The defendant's
interests clearly outweigh the government's. Moreover, the
cost/benefit considerations strongly favor confirmatory testing,
which substantially increases reliability (virtual error-free test
results) at a relatively nominal expense.

2.

Other Important Factors

While the Mathews v. Eldridge equation identifies several
obviously important factors in determining whether EMIT tests
must be confirmed, it ignores other factors essential to resolving the confirmation issue.
a. Burden of Proof The first factor is the burden of proof
involved in the proceeding. In contempt hearings, the government must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. 117 Thus, in contested contempt proceedings, the issue
is whether unconfirmed EMIT tests are sufficiently reliable to
prove drug use beyond a reasonable doubt (the highest standard of proof in American law).
This heavy burden of proof is the principal distinction
between the need for confirmation in contempt proceedings and
several cases which have not required confirmation of EMIT
tests in prison disciplinary proceedings. In prison disciplinary
hearings, where due process rights are quite limited, 118 the

116.
The sloppy procedures documented in United States v. Roy 114 DAILY
WASH. L. REP. 2481, 2488 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 1986), make it questionable
whether the District's testing program approaches a 95 percent accuracy rate. See
supra note 59. The reliability of the District's program probably improved after
October 1989, when a toxicological chemist was hired as the full-time Director of
the court's drug testing laboratory.
117.
The reasonable-doubt standard is "a prime instrument for reducing the risk
of convictions resting on factual error." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
Due process requires the government to introduce reliable evidence proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt in all criminal proceedings and juvenile adjudications
which are analogous to criminal proceedings. !d. at 364; see In re Thompson, 454
A.2d 1324 (D.C. 1982).
118.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974); Superintendent v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 4fifi (19Xfi)
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evidentiary requirements of due process are satisfied if there is
"any evidence" to support the prison official's disciplinary determination.119 Not surprisingly, a number of courts have upheld the use of unconfirmed EMIT tests in prison disciplinary
proceedings because these tests provide "some evidence" of drug
use. 120 This very low evidentiary standard, however, is diametrically opposite the reasonable-doubt standard involved in

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985). In Hill the Court noted:
Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is
whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. We decline to adopt a more stringent evidentiary standard as a constitutional requirement (emphasis added).
!d., 472 U.S. at 455-56.
See Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1986) (double EMIT);
120.
Peranzo v. Coughlin, 850 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (double EMIT);
Higgs v. Bland, 888 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1989) (double EMIT); Lahey v. Kelly, 518
N.E.2d 924 (N.Y. 1987) (double EMIT); In re Johnston, 745 P.2d 864, 867-68
(Wash. 1987) (single EMIT); Pella v. Adams, 702 F. Supp. 244 (D. Nev. 1988)
(double EMIT); Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35 (D.N.D. 1984) (single EMIT which
can be confirmed); Works v. State, 575 So. 2d 622 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (double
EMIT); Driver v. State, 576 So.2d 675 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (double EMIT). As
the court stated in In re Johnston:
[The prisoners] refer to a New Jersey Department of Corrections
study, cited in Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1511, which found the single
EMIT test to be 75 percent accurate. This discrepancy in findings would
be troubling in the context of a criminal trial, in which the State bears
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has
used illegal drugs. In light of the lesser evidentiary standards applicable
in prison disciplinary hearings, we deem these differences immaterial.
In re Johnston, 745 P.2d 864, 868 (Wash. 1987).
However, there is limited authority requiring confirmation of EMIT tests by
alternative methodologies in prison disciplinary proceedings. See Kane v. Fair, 33
Crim. L. Rep. (CCH) 2492 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1983), and Johnson v. Walton,
No. 561-84 Rm (Rutland Vt. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 1985). In Kane, the court
preliminarily enjoined Massachusetts correctional officials from introducing
unconfirmed EMIT tests into evidence in inmate disciplinary hearings. The court
focused on the punitive measures that flowed from a positive EMIT test, and the
adverse impact such a test could have on an inmate's chance for parole.
Similarly, in Johnson v. Walton, the court ruled that correctional officials in
Vermont violated the due process rights of inmates by using unconfirmed EMIT
test results in inmate disciplinary proceedings. The court required EMIT tests to
be confirmed by a different and more reliable confirmatory test procedure. Kane v.
Fair and Johnson v. Walton are discussed in Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226,
230-31 (W.D. Ky. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Higgs v. Bland, 888 F.2d
443 (6th Cir. 1989); see also In re Johnston, 745 P.2d 864, 869-70 (Wash. 1987)
(opinion of Justices Utter and Dore dissenting in part); ZEESE, supra note 10, at §
8.07.
119.
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contempt proceedings. 121
b. Focus of the Decision. The second factor which merits
consideration is that the drug test result is the sole focus of the
contempt hearing. It is not just one of many considerations
which comprise decisions such as bail and sentencing. Because
the drug test result is the only issue in the contempt hearing,
it is that much more important that they be accurate and reliable.
c. Nature of the Decision. The third important factor is
the nature of the decision involved. The contempt decision is
basically a retrospective decision that determines whether a
defendant violated release conditions by using drugs. The bail
decision, by contrast, is basically a prospective decision which
attempts to predict future conduct based upon the drug test
result and other factors. The Supreme Court has employed this
distinction in its rulings that parole revocation proceedings
automatically trigger due process protections, but parole release decisions do not (although specific parole statutes may
create such protections). 122 Because the nature of the decision
in criminal contempt proceedings is analogous to that in parole
revocation proceedings, due process requires confirmation of
EMIT tests in contempt proceedings.
d. Confirmation Required in Other Contexts. The fourth
and final factor which should be considered, in addition to the

121.
For an analysis of burdens of proof, see John Kaplan, Decision Theory and
the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1071-77 (1968); cf John S.
Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMIMOLOGY 1, 33-40 (1985).
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court held that
122.
the parole-revocation determination must comply with due process standards. The
Court noted that the first step in the revocation decision involves "a wholly retrospective factual question," i.e., whether there was a violation of parole. !d. at 479.
In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979), the Court held that the parole-release determination does not involve
inherent due process rights, but such rights may be created by statute. The Court
distinguished Morrissey on the ground that parole-release decisions often involve
"no more than informed predictions," !d. at 10, quoting from Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). The dissenting opinions in Greenholtz severely criticized
this distinction. See 442 U.S. at 18-20 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting in
part); 442 U.S. at 23-25 (Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, J.J., dissenting in part).
The Greenholtz distinction is similar to the older administrative due process
cases that recognized a due process right to a hearing when the issue involved
retrospective, adjudicative-type factual questions, but rejected the right to a hearing
when the issue involved predictive, legislative-type factual questions. See. e.g., BiMetallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Londoner v.
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
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Mathews v. Eldridge formula, is whether confirmation of EMIT
tests is generally required in other contexts. This factor has
been an important consideration in several recent due process
cases. 123
Confirmatory tests are required for the great majority of
all drug testing done today. This reflects a consensus of legal,
scholarly, and law enforcement authorities that such confirmation is appropriate and necessary before a sanction can be imposed on an individual. At the federal level, the United States
Department of Health and Human Services has issued Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 124 which apply to almost every federal agency, with
certain listed exceptions such as the Armed Forces. 125 These
Guidelines require two levels of testing: First, an initial test
using an "immunoassay screen to eliminate 'negative' urine
specimens from further consideration"; 126 and second, a confirmation test using state-of-the-art GC/MS. 127 These federal
guidelines are an excellent model for courts to consider. 128

123.
See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984): "The fact that a practice is
followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether
that practice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering . . . ."
ld. at 268, quoting from Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952). In Ake v.
Oklahoma the Court noted the following:
Oklahoma asserts that to provide Ake with psychiatric assistance on
the record before us would result in a staggering burden to the
State . . . . We are unpersuaded by this assertion. Many States, as well
as the Federal Cklvernment, currently make psychiatric assistance available to indigent defendants, and they have not found the financial burden
so great as to preclude this assistance.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1985).
124.
53 Fed. Reg. 11970-89 (April 11, 1988).
ld. at 11979 § 1.1.
125.
126.
ld. at 11980 § 1.2.
127.
ld. at 11979-80 § 1.2. Section 1.2 provides:
Confirmatory Test. A second analytical procedure to identify the presence of a specific drug or metabolite which is independent of the initial
test and which uses a different technique and chemical principle from
that of the initial test in order to ensure reliability and accuracy. (At this
time gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) is the only authorized confirmation method for cocaine, marijuana, opiates, amphetamines,
and phencyclidine.)
!d.
128.
Other key provisions of the Guidelines require protections not now required
in the Superior Court's drug detection program. These include retention of positive
samples in storage for one year for any necessary re-testing, 53 Fed. Reg. at 11984
§ 2.4(h), and quality control procedures, including blind performance testing, 53
Fed. Reg. at 11984-85, § 2.5.
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The Armed Forces, though exempt from these Guidelines,
have long required confirmation of a positive immunoassay test
by another, more reliable testing procedure before an adverse
action is taken against a member of the Armed Forces. 129 The
Federal Bureau of Prisons also requires validation of a positive
immunoassay test by persons serving sentences in contract
community treatment centers. 13° Furthermore, the American
Probation and Parole Association has recently published guidelines for drug testing that require confirmation of initial
screening tests with GC/MS when an individual denies use and
the drug test will be used as "the primary evidence in a revocation hearing." 131
It IS also significant that the Drug Enforcement
Administration's Mid-Atlantic Laboratory, which tests all the
drugs involved in D.C. Superior Court drug cases, always confirms an initial positive drug test result. 132 Given these confirmation procedures, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
has repeatedly recognized the general reliability of the DEA
laboratory's test results. 133 The PSA's drug detection programs, which do not require confirmation by a different testing
procedure, stand in stark contrast.
Moreover, a number of states have recently passed statutes
requiring that employers who test their employees for drug use
have a procedure which confirms an initial positive result with
a second laboratory test using a different procedure before any
disciplinary action is taken. 134 Even in states that have not
129.
Kevin B. Zeese, Marijuana Urinalysis Tests, 1 DRUG L. REP. 25 (1983). The
Armed Forces perform the largest number of urine tests of any organization in this
country. ld.
130.
28 C.F.R. § 550.42(c) (1991). There is no analogous requirement for validation of positive drug test results for other federal inmates. See 28 C.F.R. §
550.30(b) (1991).
131.
U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION'S
DRUG TESTING GUIDELINES AND PRACTICES FOR ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
AGENCIES § 6-7, at 23 (1991). These guidelines also provide that less rigorous
confirmation techniques may be acceptable when the test result will be used only
to confront the offender, for treatment monitoring, or for minor in-house disciplinary actions. ld. at 21, 23.
For example, the DEA laboratory first tests for PCP using the thin-layer
132.
chromatography (TLC) test, and then confirms a positive result with mass spectrometry (MS). Similarly, for marijuana the DEA laboratory uses the DuquenoisLevine color test, followed by microscopic examination and confirmation by TLC.
See, e.g., the DEA chemist's testimony in trial transcript of October 29, 1984, at
70-77, United States v. Leon Davis, Crim. No. M16240-83 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1984).
Berry v. United States, 528 A.2d 1209 (D.C. 1987); Howard v. United
133.
States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C. 1984).
134.
Shala Mills Bannister, Comment, Drug Testing Legislation: What Are the

322

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 5

yet passed these statutes, there are many state agencies that
now require confirmation of immunoassay screening tests with
a more reliable testing procedure. 135 Such confirmation is
even more appropriate in the criminal justice context. 136
That confirmation by an alternative test is not financially
impractical is underscored by the fact that all federal agencies,
the Armed Forces, many states, and even the DEA laboratory
for drug cases in Superior Court require it. Confirmation by an
alternative test is both recommended by the manufacturer of
the EMIT test in the packaging instruction, 137 it is also supported by an overwhelming consensus of the scientific community. las
States Doing? 36 KAN. L. REV. 919, 936-37 (1988).
For example, the police department of Newark, New Jersey, requires that a
135.
positive EMIT test by a recruit be confirmed by GC/MS, Fraternal Order of Police
v. City of Newark, 524 A.2d 430, 439 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); the police
and fire departments of East Point, Georgia, require that a police or fire official's
positive EMIT tests be confirmed by GC/MS, Smith v. City of E. Point, 359 S.E.2d
692, 693 (Ga. App. Ct. 1987), rev'd on other grounds City of E. Point v. Smith, 365
S.E.2d 432 (Ga. 1988); the public bus system of Palm Springs, California, requires
that a positive EMIT test of a bus driver be confirmed by GC/MS or TLC, Amal·
gamated Transit Union v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1570 (C.D.
Cal. 1987); and, the police department of Washington Township, New Jersey,
requires confirmation of a positive EMIT test by TLC, Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n
of New Jersey v. Township of Washington, 672 F. Supp. 779, 782 (D.N.J. 1987),
rev'd on other grounds 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1004
(1989).
136.
An individual's interest in maintaining employment is clearly entitled to
great weight, and it does not denigrate that interest to recognize that incarceration
or other court-imposed penal sanctions impinge upon individual liberty interests
which are entitled to even greater weight. See supra cases cited in notes 99-100.
Similarly, the stigma resulting from incarceration and the accompanying permanent
criminal record for contempt of court because of drug abuse, represents a greater
stigma than that associated with loss of employment.
137.
ZEESE, supra note 10, at 3-36.
Perhaps Dr. Hawks of the National Institute on Drug Abuse put it best:
138.
The inherent possibility of error in any assay is a matter of concern
which escalates in proportion to the consequences of the positive result. A
false positive result occurring once in 100 true positives is insignificant in
an incidence survey for research purposes. The one false positive is of
great concern, however, if it is a forensic sample from an individual
whose freedom, career or civil rights hang in the balance. In forensic
science, such occurrences are minimized to levels of little concern by the
use of confirmatory methods of analysis. High confidence can be placed on
a urine sample which is drug positive by an immunoassay method, such
as EMIT, if it is also positive by a method based on completely different
principles, such as GC/MS.
RICHARD HAWKS, THE METABOLISM, PHARMACOKINETICS AND ANALYSIS OF MARIJUANA COMPONENTS IN BODY FLUIDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-RESEARCH USES (1980),
quoted in ZEESE, supra note 10, at 3-35.
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Consideration of these additional factors reinforces the
conclusion under the Mathews v. Eldridge equation that confirmation is required of EMIT tests used in contested contempt
proceedings in the District of Columbia.

3. EMIT Court Decisions
There have been a number of recent federal and state court
decisions addressing the issue of whether EMIT test results
must be confirmed before a sanction such as imprisonment, loss
of employment, or even suspension from school can be imposed
on an individual. These decisions have been inconsistent, although the most persuasive of these cases support the need for
such confirmation.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has ruled that it is illegal to discharge a school bus attendant on the basis of an unconfirmed EMIT test which purportedly showed marijuana use by the attendant. 139 Mter reviewing at length many scientific authorities and court decisions
supporting the need to confirm EMIT tests, the court held that
such action was arbitrary and capricious. 140 The school board
had argued that the EMIT test had, in fact, been confirmed
because after the initial EMIT test yielded a positive result, a
second EMIT test was conducted on the urine sample. 141 This
is the same type of "confirmation" as is performed by PSA. The
district court emphatically rejected this argument and ordered
confirmation by a different and more reliable technique. 142
The school board appealed only the issue of whether a bus
attendant could be tested for drugs without probable cause.
The District of Columbia Circuit ruled that probable cause was
not required, but the court went on to emphasize in dicta its
agreement with the district court that an unconfirmed EMIT
test would not be adequate. 143

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505-06 (D.D.C. 1986).
!d. at 1505-07.
!d. at 1505.
!d.
The court said the following:
[T]he School System has conceded that the EMIT test is not a valid
measure of whether the subject is in possession of, is using, or is under
the influence of illicit drugs at the time of the test. As this test therefore
lacks a sufficient nexus to the appellant's legitimate concern that its employees not possess, use or be under the influence of drugs while on duty,
it is clear that the School System could not constitutionally test its em-
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Another persuasive federal court decision was issued by
Chief Judge Waters of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas. 144 Mter analyzing the shortcomings and unreliability of the EMIT test in detail, that court
ruled that a public school could not expel students based upon
unconfirmed tests. 145
These decisions are supported by other recent cases which
have indicated in dicta that unconfirmed EMIT tests violate
due process. 146 There have also been several recent decisions

ployees for drugs in the manner Jones was tested, and our analysis should
not be read to suggest the contrary (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 339 (D.C. Cir.), vacated and remanded on other
grounds sub nom., Jenkins v. Jones, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989).
144.
Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ark.), modified, 663 F. Supp. 149
(W.D. Ark. 1985).
145.
!d. The court said that:
[T]he test used bears so little relation to the guilt or innocence of any
particular student that its use as a determining factor . . . cannot be
consistent with constitutional requirements.

*

*

*

To impose a sanction as severe as expulsion for the mere presence of
these urinary metabolites in the body would, in a criminal case, constitute an impermissible punishment . . . . [F]or the reasons discussed
above, and because of the described deficiencies of the test, the court
concludes that use of the test is not reasonably related to the maintenance of order and security in the schools nor to the preservation of the
educational environment and processes.
!d., 653 F. Supp. at 40.
146.
The most significant of these cases is National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.), affd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
While the principal issue in this case was the Fourth Amendment challenge to the
Customs Service's compulsory urine testing program, the Court of Appeals clearly
expressed its view, in dicta, concerning the reliability of unconfirmed EMIT tests:
Initially, all samples are screened by the enzyme-multiplied-immunoassay technique (EMIT). Because EMIT yields a significant rate of positive
results even in the absence of drug use, all positive samples are then
screened by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS).

*

*

*

The drug-testing program is not so unreliable as to violate due process of law. While the initial screening test, EMIT, may have too high a
rate of false-positive results for the presence of drugs, the union does not
dispute the evidence that follow-up test, GC/MS, is almost always accurate, assuming proper storage, handling, and measurement techniques.
!d., 816 F.2d at 181.
In Harmon v. Auger, 768 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1985), the lower court had declared unlawful a regulation of the Iowa prison system which provided that a positive result on an EMIT test created an irrebuttable presumption of drug usage by
an inmate. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the prisoner must be allowed, as a mat-
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upholding the reliability of drug testing procedures only because positive EMIT tests have been confirmed by more reliable tests. 147
The reliability of unconfirmed EMIT tests has been the
subject of a substantial amount of litigation in the area of prison disciplinary proceedings. Virtually all of these cases have
upheld the use of unconfirmed EMIT tests in this context because of the very limited due process rights of prisoners, and
the legal standard requiring the court to uphold the disciplinary sanction if there is "any evidence" in the record to support
it. 148 However, even under this very low standard, two lower
courts have required confirmation of EMIT tests in prison disciplinary proceedings. 149
There have also been several cases holding that unconfirmed EMIT tests can be used in probation revocation proceedings, 150 and that the EMIT test is sufficiently reliable to be
admissible in other court proceedings. 151
ter of due process, to challenge the accuracy and reliability of the EMIT test. !d.
at 276-77.
See Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1987), involving a
147.
challenge by correctional officers in Cook County, Illinois, to a compulsory urine
testing program: "The urinalysis program which defendants have implemented, consisting of the EMIT/GCMS chemical analysis procedure, is a highly accurate and
reliable procedure for detecting the presence of metabolites of cocaine, marijuana
and heroin or opiates in a sample of urine." See also Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F.
Supp. 1504, 1512 (D. Ind. 1985) ("Since plaintiffs urine sample has been confirmed
as positive by the TLC method, the EMIT test has been proven reliable in
plaintiffs situation."); United States v. Harper, 22 M.J. 157, 161 (C.M.A. 1986)
(immunoassay test confirmed by mass spectrometry sufficiently reliable); American
Fed'n of Gov. Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 729 (S.D. Ga. 1986) ("A
positive EMIT test must be verified through the more expensive gas chromatography testing process which, according to testimony given to this Court, is virtually
100% accurate, assuming that proper chain of custody procedures are followed."); cf
Adkins v. Martin, 699 F. Supp. 1510, 1513-14 (W.D. Okla. 1988) (prison inmates);
Brown v. State, 760 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (probation revocation).
148.
See supra note 120.
!d.
149.
150.
People v. Walker, 517 N.E.2d 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (double EMIT sufficiently reliable to establish violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence); State v. Johnson, 527 A.2d 250 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (no abuse of discretion for trial court to revoke probation on basis of double EMIT test); Smith v.
State, 298 S.E.2d 482 (Ga. 1983) (no abuse of discretion for trial court to revoke
probation on basis of single EMIT test).
151.
See Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1988); cases cited supra note
43. Compare Isaacks v. State, 646 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (positive
EMIT test results not admissible when certain testing conditions not met) with
Bolieu v. State, 779 S.W.2d 489, 490-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (not deciding
whether an uncorroborated positive EMIT test result "was sufficient to support the
trial court's decision to revoke probation").
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There is thus judicial authority for a variety of positions on
the reliability of the EMIT test and the need to confirm positive
results with a confirmatory test. 152 However, the most per-

In United States v. Roy, 118 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2317 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Sep. 24,
1985), Judge Burgess ruled that the EMIT test was admissible in evidence in a
contempt proceeding in D.C. Superior Court. ld. This decision was made in response to a defense motion for judgement of acquittal at the conclusion of the
government's case, but before presentation of the defense case. Although the court
denied the defense motion at that time, the defense renewed its motion after all
the evidence had been introduced, and the court then granted the motion for
judgement of acquittal. United States v. Roy, 114 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2481 (D.C.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 1986). The court indicated that there was a great deal of uncertainty in the contempt hearing record on the amount of time that PCP is retained
in the body, and as a result the court could not find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant had ingested PCP after (rather than before) he had been placed
on pretrial release. Id. at 2481, 2491.
The court further stated that it was "not necessary" for it to decide whether a
positive EMIT test could "sustain a fmding beyond a reasonable doubt that any
drug identified by that test was in the body." Id., at 2490. The court's decision
contains an excellent analysis of the scientific and legal issues involved in the use
of EMIT tests in contempt proceedings.
Several of the cases cited above have made the serious error of basing their
152.
rulings on generalized statements as to the accuracy of EMIT tests in the abstract.
See. e.g., Harmon v. Auger. 768 F.2d 270, 276 (8th Cir. 1985) (EMIT test results
"about 95% accurate"); Peranzo v. Coughlin, 850 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1988) (double
EMIT test 98% accurate); Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35 (DN.D. 1984) (single
EMIT test 97-99% accurate). Putting aside the fact that not even the manufacturer
of the EMIT test claims such high accuracy rates for its test, these generalized
statements as to the accuracy of the test miss the fundamental point that the
accuracy of the test cannot be considered in the abstract, but only in relation to
the procedures utilized in the specific drug testing program. If proper procedures
are routinely followed, the accuracy rate of the program will be substantially
greater than if proper procedures are not routinely followed. The sloppiness of the
D.C. Superior Court procedures documented in United States v. Roy, 113 DAILY W.
L. REP. 2317, give cause for concern that the accuracy rate of the D.C. pretrial
program may be far below the idealized 95-99% accuracy rate referred to in the
above cases.
There has also been an attempt to correlate the supposed accuracy rate of the
EMIT test with numerical probability rates for the different standards of proof. See
Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504 (S.DN.Y. 1985): "[T)he probabilities associated "'ith the various standards of proof may be fairly estimated as 50+% for
preponderance of the evidence, 70% for clear and convincing evidence, above 80%
for clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence, and 95+% for evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt." 608 F. Supp. at 1512, citing United States v. Fatico, 458 F.
Supp. 388, 403-04 (E.DN.Y.), affd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1073 (1980).
This mode of analysis cannot be dispositive of the due process issue involved in
drug testing. Even assuming that the EMIT test was 96% accurate, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at least 95% accuracy, this comparison does not
even address the central due process issue of whether the cost/benefit analysis of
Mathews l'. Eldridge requires the expenditure of additional funds for confirmation
testing which would raise the reliability of the reported result to over 99.9%.
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suasive cases support the considerations discussed above,
which overwhelmingly lead to the conclusion that unconfirmed
EMIT tests are not sufficiently reliable to satisfy due process
standards in the context of a criminal contempt proceeding.

B.

Modification of Release Conditions

The decision to modify conditions of pretrial release is
similar to the contempt decision, and due process requires
confirmation of EMIT tests in this circumstance as well. Modification of release conditions can result in immediate incarceration of the defendant or other significant restraints on the
defendant's liberty. Of course, as in the contempt context, due
process does not require confirmation unless the defendant denies drug usage and contests the reliability of the positive test
result.
While modification of conditions of release is similar to
contempt (and often is considered by the court as an alternative sanction in contempt proceedings), there are also certain
differences between the two. One difference is that modification
of conditions of release does not result in a separate conviction,
nor a permanent criminal record for contempt of court. In general, this makes modification of conditions a less severe
sanction than contempt, but it is certainly possible that in
specific cases modification of release conditions will result in a
longer period of incarceration than a contempt conviction. 153
Another important difference is that the standard of proof
for modification of conditions of release ("clear and convincing
evidence") 154 is a lower standard than that for contempt.
While still a high standard for the government to satisfy, it
does impose a lesser burden.
A final difference is that Superior Court judges consider
modification of release conditions more frequently than contempt proceedings. 155 Thus, there will be a somewhat greater
number of contested cases where confirmation will be neces-

153.
The maximum sentence that can be imposed for contempt is imprisonment
for six months, see supra text at note 33, but pretrial incarceration lasts an
indeterminate period of time until the disposition of the case. D.C. Superior Court
judges generally give priority to cases involving incarcerated defendants, and the
great majority of these cases are resolved within six months. However, individuals
subject to pretrial incarceration infrequently must wait more than six months for
the resolution of their case due to the overcrowding of the court's criminal docket.
See supra note 31.
154.
155.
See supra note 102.
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sary, increasing the fiscal burden on the government.
Of course, most of the considerations requiring confirmation in contempt proceedings also apply to modifying conditions
of release. The defendant faces similar threats to his or her
liberty (including perhaps an even longer period of incarceration), and stigmatization. The balancing of interests involved is
essentially the same. While the due process argument for confirmation is less compelling than for contempt proceedings, the
balance still favors confirmation for contested hearings to modify release conditions.

C.

The Initial Bail Decision

Due process does not require confirmation of positive EMIT
tests prior to the use of these test results by the judicial officer
in making the initial bail decision. The principal reason for this
is the need for a very quick decision, and the apparent impossibility of confirming EMIT tests within the allotted period of
time.
In D.C. Superior Court, the initial bail hearing is generally
held within 24 hours of arrest. The defendant obviously has a
strong interest in a prompt bail decision by the court, and
would be prejudiced by any unnecessary delay. Indeed, it
would appear unlawful for the District to routinely delay bail
hearings for more than 48 hours after arrest in order to conduct initial or confirmatory urine tests. 156
While the District's in-house EMIT testing equipment
allows arrestee test results to be reported to the judicial officer
within a very short period (one to two hours), confirmation
tests like GC/MS must be conducted at certified laboratories
away from the courthouse. It appears to be impossible to routinely ship urine samples to an outside laboratory and have the
tests conducted and reported back to the court within 48 hours
of arrest. Thus, the constitutional requirement of an expeditious bail decision would seem to negate the possibility of confirmation prior to the bail decision. 157
156.
See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that in cases involving only "prop157.
erty" interests, the need for quick governmental action can justify the temporary
postponement of a hearing until after those property interests have been adversely
affected. However, this principle has never been applied to liberty interests because, unlike temporary deprivations of property, deprivations of liberty interests
are irreparable.
For example, in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988), a
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Other factors also diminish the need to confirm EMIT tests
used in the initial bail determination. The positive drug test
result is only one piece of information that is used in the bail
decision, and it is unlikely that it will be the most crucial.
Other information, such as the defendant's ties to the community and record of appearances in prior court cases, are likely
to have greater weight. However, the drug test result can be an
important factor in the bail determination, and can even be the
factor that tips the balance in favor of incarceration or release
in a particular case.
Another relevant consideration is the expense involved.
Since more than half of adult arrestees test positive for drugs,
confirmation of all positive results would require many thousands of confirmation tests each year. Obviously these tests
would create a substantial expense.
The standard for consideration of information at the initial
bail hearing is important. Generally, the information provided
to the judicial officer at the initial hearing (by the Pretrial
Service Agency and defense counsel) is anecdotal and less reliable than evidence that may be introduced in future court hearings, such as in contempt proceedings or at trial. However, a
higher standard of reliability should apply to information such
as prior convictions or positive drug test results, because they
are subject to empirical verification, and are more likely to be
considered reliable for that very reason.
For all these reasons, particularly the need for a very quick
decision, due process does not require confirmation of EMIT
tests prior to the initial bail hearing.
However, all initial positive test results should be confirmed when the defendant is detained or subjected to any

bank president who had been indicted for banking law violations was temporarily
suspended from participating in the affairs of his bank by order of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This order was based upon a statutory
provision which authorized the FDIC to postpone the hearing on the suspension for
ninety days. Although there was no dispute in the Supreme Court that the bank
president's property interests had been adversely affected, the Court held that the
suspension without a prior hearing did not violate due process rights, stating, "An
important government interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the
deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding
prompt action justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial
deprivation." !d. at 240 (citing North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211
U.S. 306, 314-21 (1908) (contaminated food)); see also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55,
64-66 (1979) (suspension of horse trainer); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-15
(1977) (suspension of driver's license).
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significant limits on his or her pretrial liberty. The most compelling situation obviously involves those persons who are preventively detained, not only because of the applicable "clear
and convincing evidence" standard, 158 but also because these
persons cannot be released pretrial, and comprise a very small
fraction of defendants in Superior Court. In addition, all persons who have been detained in jail under restrictive bail conditions, or released with substantial restrictions on their liberty, should be entitled to. confirmation as a matter of due process. No individual should be forced to remain in jail pretrial,
or be burdened with other substantial restrictions on pretrial
liberty, if the judicial decision was based in part on erroneous
information that could be easily corrected. It is important that
positive drug test results for such persons be confirmed immediately after the initial hearing, and that the court be informed
expeditiously of all false positive results so that the bail status
of these individuals can be reconsidered by a judicial officer
based upon accurate information.

D.

The Sentencing Hearing

Although the sentencing hearing is obviously not a "pretrial" proceeding, it is also useful to consider the need to confirm
positive EMIT tests in this context.
Superior Court judges often postpone sentencing for six to
seven weeks after conviction so that a presentence report can
be prepared. 159 This report typically includes the results of
any drug tests taken by the defendant and a section on the
defendant's use of drugs based upon an interview with the defendant. Most often, the defendant's self-reported drug use
correlates with the results of the drug testing, but when the
defendant contests the positive drug test results, confirmation
of those results should be required by due process if the court
imposes any substantial restrictions on the defendant's liberty.
At the sentencing hearing, like the bail hearing, the drug
test results are only one factor among many that will be consid158.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(b)(2) (1989). Sef' generally United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en bane) (holding that the "clear and convincing
evidence standard" is appropriate in pretrial detention proceedings), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
159.
See generally Williams v. United States, 293 A.2d 484, 487 (D.C. 1972)
("the judge's refusal to obtain a presentencing report" viewed as "highly questionable"); Wilson v. United States, 278 A.2d 461 (D.C. 1971) ("[T]rial judges are not
required in every case to obtain a presentencing report.").
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ered by the court. In addition, the court can consider information from a variety of sources, even if that information has not
been totally verified. 160 One important difference between the
two proceedings is that when sentencing proceedings are continued for preparation of a presentence report, there is no need
for a very quick decision, and there is sufficient time for confirmation of any positive drug test result. In light of these considerations, and particularly the fact that very few defendants
contest the positive drug test results contained in the presentence report, it would appear that due process requires confirmation of contested drug test results which will be used at sentencing.

E.

Confirmation of Negative Test Results

In every context considered so far, only positive drug test
results had the potential of adversely affecting an individual's
liberty interests, and therefore only positive results would have
to be confirmed consistent with due process. However, there is
one circumstance where due process may require the confirmation of negative drug test results, because they could adversely
affect an individual's liberty interests - the sentencing of juvenile offenders in drug cases. The 1989 survey of superior court
judges, 161 revealed that several judges were likely to impose
harsher sentences on juveniles involved in drug offenses who
tested negative than on juveniles involved in drug offenses who
tested positive because, as one judge indicated, "[t]hose kids are

160.
The Supreme Court has stated that the sentencing judge "may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of
information he may consider, or the source from which it may come." United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). However, due process imposes certain
limitations on the permissible information which can be considered at sentencing. A
sentence is invalid if it is based upon allegations which are "materially untrue,"
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948), or information which is "inaccurate"
or "improper." Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 n.7 (1974). See
generally McPhaul v. United States, 452 A.2d 371 (D.C. 1982) ("While the court
could properly consider evidence bearing on the severity of the assault in imposing
sentence, the implication that appellant was being sentenced for homicide [evidenced by the statement "... as a result of that assault ... a man died within a
year"] was inappropriate . . . . "); see also D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 32(B)(3)(A),
which requires the sentencing court to "afford the defendant or his counsel an
opportunity to comment" on the information contained in the presentence report,
and permits the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to permit the defendant "to
introduce testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual inaccuracy
contained in the presentence report."
161.
TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15.
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just doing it for the money." 162
The use of false negative tests in this narrow context presents serious due process concerns, particularly because EMIT
and other screening tests may generate a much greater number
of false negative results than false positive results. 163 Thus, a
juvenile facing sentencing in a drug case who contests any
negative drug test result should have the due process right to

162.

The report noted the following:
Judges also pointed out that a significant number of juveniles who are
charged with drug dealing consistently test negative for drugs. This was
contrasted with the situation for adult defendants, where persons charged
with drug offenses are usually drug users as well. Several judges commented that they were likely to be harsher on drug-negative than drugpositive juveniles who are found involved on drug dealing charges because
as one judge said, "[t]hose kids are just doing it for the money." (emphasis in original.)
TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 13.
163.
The Visher and McFadden study documented false positive rates for EMIT
of 2.2% for opiates, 2.5% for eucaine, and 2.1% for marijuana, VISHER &
McFADDEN, supra note 51, at 3; see also table accompanying note 60. On the
other hand, the study documented false negative rates for EMIT of 18% for opiates, 23% for cocaine, and 29% for marijuana. VISHER & McFADDEN, supra note
51, at 4. The following table displays those findings:
False Negative Rates* by Drug Type
Percent positives missed by test

Opiates

-

Cocaine

RIA

m

Marijuana

PCP

Amphetamines

EMIT CJ TDx IS.'SI TLC

*Positive by GC/MS but negative by screening test
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have the negative result confirmed.

F.

Conclusions as to the Need to Confirm Drug Test Results

This article has considered a variety of contexts in which
drug test results can adversely affect an individual involved in
a criminal proceeding in D.C. Superior Court. In light of the
factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge and the other factors
discussed above, it is possible to prioritize the circumstances
where due process requires confirmation of contested drug test
results. Obviously, the most compelling argument is for confirmation of drug test results which will be used in criminal contempt proceedings, followed by drug test results which will be
used in proceedings to preventively detain an individual or
modify conditions of release so as to incarcerate the defendant.
Other contexts, such as the sentencing hearing, involve less
compelling due process arguments for confirmation, but, on
balance, several of these contexts appear also to require confirmation.
Is it possible to enunciate general principles specifying
those situations where confirmation is required? In the view of
this author, due process requires confirmation of initial screening tests (such as EMIT) before any sanction can be imposed or
any substantial adverse action can be taken against a defendant based upon the screening test when the defendant disputes the test result. In those rare situations where the need
for immediate action makes prior confirmation impossible (as
in the initial bail decision), confirmation should be accomplished as quickly as possible after the court's decision whenever the court imposes a substantial restraint on the
defendant's liberty. 164
These general principles for confirmation of drug test results are not only required by due process analysis, but are also
consistent with the great majority of drug testing done today in

164.
Among the variety of sanctions which have been imposed in Superior Court
for positive drug tests that constitute substantial restraints on liberty are the following: imposing a monetary bond which results in the incarceration of the defendant for any period of time; a curfew or order to "stay away" from an area or
from a person; a requirement to come to the courthouse every week to provide a
urine sample; and, a court-ordered referral for drug treatment or counselling which
requires regular attendance on an in-patient or out-patient basis. Court actions in
response to positive drug tests which do not appear to impose significant restraints
on liberty include: a stern lecture by the judge from the bench, and an order to
maintain telephonic contact with a custodian on a weekly basis.
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contexts other than the pretrial context. There appears to be a
consensus of legal, scholarly, and law enforcement authorities
that confirmation is appropriate and necessary when a sanction
can be imposed on an individual as a result of drug testing.
VI.

ADDITIONAL DUE PROCESS ISSUES RAISED BY THE
DISTRICT'S PROGRAM

In addition to the confirmation issue discussed above, pretrial drug testing raises two other substantial due process concerns. The first area of concern is that persons who are arrested may be given misleading information about the uses of their
drug test results in court proceedings. The Pretrial Services
Agency Training and Procedure Manual instructs its staff to
approach arrestees in the court's lock-up and request a urine
sample, informing the arrestee that the results of the test performed on the sample "will be used only to determine conditions of release in your case. They cannot be used to find you
guilty or innocent of today's charges." 165 The PSA representative cannot compel the arrestee to submit an initial urine sample but can only obtain the sample with the arrestee's consent
and cooperation. The information provided to the arrestee on
the possible uses of the urine test result in the court proceeding
thus constitutes critical information for the arrestee to consider
in deciding whether or not to provide a urine sample.
The PSA Training Manual directive is seriously misleading
in that a positive test result can be introduced at trial to impeach the defendant who testifies. 166 Even though the drug
test result cannot be introduced in the government's case-inchief, the use for impeachment purposes is potentially quite
damaging to a defendant who takes the witness stand at trial
and testifies that he or she did not use drugs. Such impeachment could totally destroy the credibility of the defendant.
The Supreme Court has long held that procedural due
process requires notice that is "reasonably calculated to appraise" a person of the consequences of governmental action. 167 The Court has also made clear that where the individual interests at stake are substantial, there must be even

165.
See supra note 43.
166.
See Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1988), discussed supra at
note 43; see also Patterson v. United States, 580 A.2d 1319 (D.C. 1990).
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983); Mullane v.
167.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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greater certainty that the notice will be effective. 168
PSA's current notice to arrestees clearly violates these
principles, and must be modified. An accurate and constitutionally acceptable notice would inform the arrestee that the drug
test result "will be used by the judicial officer in making a
release decision, and can possibly be used against you if you
testify at the trial in this case." 169
The second due process issue raised by the District's drug
testing program is whether urine samples must be preserved
by PSA so that they can be provided to defendants upon request for re-testing at an independent laboratory. In general,
due process requires the government to preserve and make
available to defendants in criminal cases all evidence that may
be exculpatory and that "might be expected to play a significant
role in the suspect's defense." 170
While there is some authority for applying this principle to
the drug testing area, 171 the Supreme Court's decision in
California v. Trombetta, 172 holding that the government need
not preserve breath samples of suspected drunk drivers, would
seem to substantially undercut any similar argument for urine
samples used in drug testing. The Court's decision in
Trombetta was based upon three principal rationales. First,
given the reliability of the state's breath-analysis procedures,
the chances were "extremely low that preserved samples would

168.
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1982); Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978). See generally TRIBE, supra note 78,
at 732-36.
In addition to due process concerns, the District's testing program also
169.
raises concerns with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. However, this privilege extends only to testimonial evidence, not physical
evidence obtained from bodily fluids such as blood and urine. See Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 764-65 (1966) (blood test); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub.
Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1527-28 (D. Neb. 1987) (urine test), affd, 884 F.2d
562, 567 (8th Cir. 1988). Even assuming that this barrier could be overcome, there
is a substantial question as to whether the use of drug test results for impeachment purposes would constitute a "substantial hazard" of self-incrimination, which
is also required to invoke this Fifth Amendment privilege. See California v. Byers,
402 U.S. 424, 429 (1971).
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976).
170.
171.
State v. Quelnan, 767 P.2d 243 (Haw. 1989) (unclear if decision based on
constitutional or statutory grounds); People v. Moore, 666 P.2d 419 (Cal. 1983)
(probation revocation proceeding prior to California v. Trombetta); Banks v. FAA,
687 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1982) (employment termination also prior to California v.
Trombetta). See generally Lois Yurow, Comment, Alternative Challenges to Drug
Testing, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 148, 165-68 (1989).
172.
467 U.S. 479 (1984).
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have been exculpatory" and were "much more likely" to provide
inculpatory evidence if retested by the defendant. 173 This rationale would certainly apply to the District's drug testing program if the District confirmed the EMIT test with a more reliable confirmation test such as GC/MS. Even in the absence of
such confirmation, it would be difficult to convince a court that
a re-test of EMIT by the defendant would be more likely to
provide exculpatory than inculpatory evidence. 174
Even if this first rationale could be overcome, the second
rationale of the Court's decision was that the defendant had
other reasonably available means of challenging the accuracy of
the breath-analysis testing procedures. 175 This same rationale
would also apply to drug testing because the reliability of the
procedures employed is subject to similar challenges by the
defendant. 176
The final rationale of the Court's decision was that the
police had not acted in bad faith in destroying the breath samples but in accord with their normal practice. 177 Similarly, no
bad faith could reasonably be claimed because PSA routinely
discards urine samples after its testing has been completed.
Thus, for all these reasons, it appears virtually certain that the
courts would not recognize a due process requirement to retain
urine samples for re-testing by the defendant.

VII.

THE MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE TEST

The final topic discussed in this article is the usefulness of
the Mathews v. Eldridge equation in determining the scope of
due process protections, particularly whether due process requires confirmation of EMIT screening tests. The Mathews v.
Eldridge test, as noted above, has been the subject of consid-

173.
Id. at 489-90.
174.
Several cases involving prison disciplinary proceedings have also ruled that
an inmate has no due process right to re-test a challenged urine sample. Spence v.
Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1986); Hoeppner v. State, 379 N.W.2d 23,
25-26 (Iowa App. 1985) (re-test would not disprove "some evidence" of drug use);
Pella v. Adams, 723 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Nev. 1989).
175.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-90. These alternatives included cross-examination of the operator of the breath-analysis equipment, and introduction of documentary evidence concerning the reliability of the equipment. Id.
176.
See supra notes 59 & 151.
177.
467 U.S. at 488; see also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), where
the Court held that in the absence of bad faith on the part of the police, the
failure to preserve semen samples or other "potentially useful evidence" does not
constitute a denial of due process. Id. at !'i8.
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erable scholarly criticism, including criticism that it focuses
exclusively on "instrumental" judgments about the accuracy of
a proceeding. 178
The area of pretrial drug testing offers a useful vantage
point to evaluate these criticisms. Insuring the reliability of
drug testing results would seem to involve essentially "instrumental" judgments, which the Mathews v. Eldridge equation
was designed to resolve. How useful is the Mathews v. Eldridge
test?
The Mathews v. Eldridge test clearly focuses on three factors which are important in considering whether or not due
process requires confirmation of initial screening tests. The
interests of the individual and the government in such confirmation testing are obviously highly relevant considerations, as
are the cost/benefit considerations. If a confirmation test offered minimally increased reliability at great expense, it would
undercut any due process right to such confirmation. Conversely, if a confirmation test offered substantially increased reliability (here virtual certainty with GC/MS confirmation) at minimal expense, it would substantially strengthen the due process
right to such confirmation. It is thus apparent that each of the
three Mathews v. Eldridge factors reflect important considerations in the due process calculus.
However, the Mathews v. Eldridge equation does not encompass other factors that are perhaps even more important in
determining whether confirmation procedures are required by
due process. The applicable burden of proof is one such factor.
In other words, what degree of reliability must the drug test
have in the proceeding? This is an important consideration in
all drug testing contexts, and it may be the most important
consideration in certain contexts, i.e., when the standard of
proof is extremely low ("any evidence" of drug use for prison
disciplinary proceedings) or very high (proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" in contempt proceedings).
Another important consideration is how quickly the drug
test results must be provided to the decisionmaker. This would
appear to be the central consideration in the determination
that confirmation is not required prior to use of drug test results in the initial bail hearing.
In addition, how central is the drug test result to the spe-

178.

See supra notes 77 -IH.
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cific decision involved? There is obviously an important distinction between the need to verify a drug test which will be the
sole evidence in a proceeding for contempt or to modify conditions of release, and the need to verify a drug test which will be
one of many factors in proceedings such as sentencing hearings
and initial bail hearings. Closely related is the nature of the
proceeding, i.e., whether it is a retrospective decision which
seeks to punish for past transgressions (as in a contempt proceeding), or a prospective decision which seeks to predict future
conduct (as in the initial bail decision).
A final important consideration is what other jurisdictions
require with respect to drug testing, and what the weight of
scientific and legal opinion is with respect to confirmation testing. To the extent that confirmation is required in other contexts and is not prohibitively expensive, such confirmation may
also be determined to be necessary for pretrial testing.
These additional factors, which were not set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge/ 79 are important considerations in the
due process equation. In certain pretrial contexts, such as the
contempt hearing and the initial bail hearing, these additional
factors appear to be of greater importance in resolving the due
process issue than the factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.
This is not to advocate abandonment of the three factors
set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge. These factors must, however,
be supplemented with the additional factors set forth above if
there is to be a thorough consideration of the interests involved
in confirming drug testing results in the pretrial context.
Whether the issue involves the EMIT test or newer technologies that are becoming available, 180 the courts must employ a
comprehensive framework for analyzing the extent of due process protections required for pretrial drug testing programs.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Pretrial drug testing programs may expand substantially
in state and federal courts in the next few years, based upon
the District of Columbia model. There are, however, major
flaws in the District's program, especially the failure to confirm
positive EMIT screening tests with more reliable confirmatory
179.
Several of these factors were considered by the Supreme Court in other
cases involving due process protections, as discussed supra text accompanying notes
122-23.
180.
CLARK, supra note 106, at 34 n.12.
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tests, and providing persons who are arrested with misleading
information on the use of drug test results in their court cases.
In these important respects, the District's program violates
fundamental due process principles. The District should modify
its procedures to comply with procedural due process guarantees, and persons implementing newer drug testing programs
should be careful to insure that their procedures satisfy due
process requirements as well. Since important liberty interests
are at stake, it is crucial that drug testing programs be based
on fair and reliable procedures.

